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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Literacy is often thought of as a skill-set, that is, an ability to read and write in the 
dominant language of one’s socio-historical milieu. Illiteracy, on the other hand, is often 
thought of as a lack – an absence of a necessary skill-set that influences how well one can 
work and communicate (via reading and writing) within their dominant language and 
their society. In other words, illiteracy seems to have been defined by its relationship to 
the definition of literacy, that is, as a “negative-literacy” or a “not-literacy” that creates a 
lacuna of meaning when attempting to define illiteracy as something more than just the 
negative side of a bifurcation. In this thesis, I am interested in shifting the definition of 
literacy and illiteracy – and more generally our experience of language – from a practical 
to an aesthetic frame of reference. In this shift of discourse about literacy, it will be my 
hope that I may come to a deeper understanding of literacy and illiteracy as immanent to 
each other rather than opposed, and that I’ll be able to translate this new understanding of 
literacy and illiteracy into potential future suggestions for a practical pedagogical 
methodology. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: A PROBLEM OF DICHOTOMIES – LITERACY VS. 
ILLITERACY 
  
There’s a certain acceptance that comes with learning how to read and write in a 
language. It’s large, isn’t it - English?1 And there’s a way in which we come into being in 
and through language and communication. As a child, I remember learning how to write 
my name, slowly, iteratively, until I got it right. That was me – my name. I could spell it 
out and leave a trace of myself, then. Writing seemed – and continues to feel to me, now 
– so much bigger than myself: something that allows me to emerge, to become, and to 
connect with others and their stories. Entering into that way of being – becoming able to 
read and write – much like the classroom in which I was taught, seemed right. By that I 
mean, because of how large it seemed, how ancient it felt and correct it was – this letter 
combined with these four other letters creates this word that refers to and names this 
thing in the world – to my five year old mind, because the adults were using it, because it 
seemed to be “working,” and because I was being taught how to also be literate, it, 
alphabetic literacy, convinced me that in order to be a person correctly, I must have to 
participate.  
 My grandmother reading to me as a child helped galvanize my interest in 
acquiring an adeptness with language, too. It wouldn’t be until much later in my life that I 
																																																						
1 Of course, here I mean any language – that goes without saying – but I’m specifying English so as not to 
reiterate language, and because, obviously, English is the dominant language I was raised with and within.  
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would learn that my grandmother was a literacy coach2 in Scarborough, Maine – where I 
grew up and spent the first 13 years of my life – but the stories she’d tell in her living 
room were enough to inspire in me an interest as to what she was doing, and how I could 
do it too. Of course, illiteracy was never a concept I heard about or was talked to about as 
a child. Being literate was the norm – it was the expectation. As a young boy, it never 
crossed my mind to deeply and thoughtfully consider how I was experiencing my being-
in-the-world during this process of crossing over into a literate-way-of-being. And, of 
course, I’m not disappointed in my younger self for not critiquing the socio-intellectual 
milieu in which I was raised; that kind of level of awareness wouldn’t present itself until 
college. No, the fact that I was raised in this way – taking literacy for granted – is a lived-
reality that I’m now grateful for: that diffuse desire for literacy is exactly what I’m now 
interested in calling into question.  
 Eva Maria Simms, for example – a phenomenologist who’s inspired a lot of my 
work, including this thesis – begins her essay, “Questioning the Value of Literacy” by 
writing that “Reading and writing seem to be harmless, innocuous skills … but how does 
the acquisition of literacy affect the child’s consciousness?”3 Her next sentence calls 
attention to the surprising silence surrounding this topic, and I can corroborate that 
observation: there is a profound silence about illiteracy, especially in the field of 
rhetorical theory. While there’s plenty of research studying the history of literacy4 – the 
“rise of consciousness” as Ong calls it –  and the ways in which this specific vein in 
																																																						
2	A fact that seems remarkably prescient to my own career goals now, and most assuredly on some level 
has influenced them. 
3	Simms, Questioning the Value of Literacy, 20.  
4	See Ong, Goody, Illich, Havelock et. al.  
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history spins out into fractals that influence many different intellectual and material 
developments, there aren’t many bodies of work that call literacy into question and 
critique the way in which it influences our experience of the world. Literacy is a good, 
full stop.5 Simms writes that this “kind of cultural belief in the desirability of literacy is 
what the phenomenological tradition calls a ‘natural attitude’”6 via Husserl. By isolating 
and then actively suspending this desirability, we may begin to explore how we take for 
granted being able to read and write and engage with written text in the dominant 
language of our social milieu, and how that ability influences the way we communicate 
and engage with the world, others, and ourselves.  
Historians and rhetoricians alike would agree, for example, that literacy is an 
acquired skill and has aided in the construction and sustainability of societies throughout 
history. The accumulation and distribution of knowledge over time has increased, 
bolstered by written communication and the ability to read such communication, 
especially since the inception of Gutenberg’s press in the 15th century. Literacy is 
valuable, and the purpose of this thesis is not to argue against the value of literacy as 
such; to do so would be absurd and would put into tension the material nature and the 
theoretical nature of this project. Instead, I’m interested in reevaluating the study of 
literacy from a rhetorical perspective, specifically to challenge the understanding of 
literacy and illiteracy as a binary.  
																																																						
5	Even now, for example, as I’m writing this I’m relying on my being-literate: both with reading and 
writing, and with the conceptual knowledge and language I’m engaging in. Both allow me the space to 
move my argument, but this kind of ability does have consequences with regard to my perception. What are 
those? 
6	Simms, Questioning the Value of Literacy, 21.  
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This kind of isolation of literacy within binary logic, of course, necessarily means 
that there’s some way of being that must be uncovered underneath, or beside/behind 
being-literate: after all, we aren’t born literate. And, of course, there is an exterior to 
literacy which is called illiteracy. But again, here, analogous to how there’s a surprising 
silence surrounding any sort of sustained critique of literacy, including within rhetoric, 
there’s a similar lacuna in the exporation of illiteracy from an academically and 
conceptually rigorous point of view. To clarify, I am not conflating orality with illiteracy. 
By definition, orality, or what Ong calls primary orality refers to those “persons totally 
unfamiliar with writing.”7 Illiteracy, on the other hand, seems to always already have 
been defined in the negative as the dark, vestigial aspect of literacy that necessarily needs 
to be overcome. In other words, orality does not depend on there being writing, while 
illiteracy seems to only have emerged as the after-image of the excess of literacy; it is 
what remains when the proliferation of literacy fails to fill certain spots, and peoples 
lived experiences are influenced by the existence of literacy, but not the way-of-being it 
catalyzes.  
That is to say that the space in between orality and illiteracy isn’t as simple as it 
seems. It isn’t a simple intellectual or societal progression that’s naturally 
accommodating to the individuals caught up in these ways of being. Literacy, for 
example, “begins with writings” as Ong reminds us, while orality fundamentally doesn’t. 
Orality doesn’t need writing: illiteracy does. It at least needs it to exist. But what does 
that mean for illiteracy, then? Consider this description of literacy proffered by David 
Olsen: “we may think of literacy as both a cognitive and a social condition, the ability to 
																																																						
7	Ong, Orality and Literacy, 6.  
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participate actively in a community of readers who have agreed on some principle of 
reading, a hermeneutics if you will, a set of texts to be treated as significant and a 
working agreement on the appropriate or valid interpretation(s) of those texts.”8 Such a 
definition, while comprehensive for the literate-body, calls for a negative extrapolation 
when inverted in an attempt to define the illiterate-body. By following Olsen’s definition, 
it would have to be assumed that the illiterate-body is one that would be “unable to 
participate actively” in a community of readers – a definition that would sequester the 
illiterate as the “negative other” as compared to the “positive” or “valuable” literate-
body. This thesis enters and will move within this lacuna of meaning for the illiterate-
body, for it is exactly this “lack of meaning” that acts as evidence for the inherent 
problem of putting epistemology underneath ontology. 
This thesis hopes to critique the fundamental problem of a powerful dichotomy in 
a productive, rhetorical way. Literacy and illiteracy can no longer be understood as 
strictly a part of the realm of epistemology; rather, I want to open up our understanding 
of illiteracy, arguing that it is always an influential factor in our ontological status, which 
includes even being able to talk about the epistemic as such. In order to organize this 
move, it’s necessary to begin breaking down the myth surrounding the individual in 
thought – that is, it’s necessary to begin breaking down the boundary between the I-Self, 
and the Self-as-always-Other. With a more porous boundary between Self and Other, I 
am better equipped to dismantle the dichotomous understanding of illiteracy and literacy. 
Additionally, in exploring illiteracy as a way-of-being that is not opposed to literacy but 
																																																						
8 Olsen, The World on Paper, 274.  
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constitutive of it, it is important to consider literacy and illiteracy as historical concepts 
that are more complex than our current interpretations admit to.  
My argument generally is that literacy and illiteracy need to be folded back into 
each other, recognizing the mutual, ontological immanence between them, while 
concurrently positing a different conception of symbolism that is fundamentally aesthetic 
and rhetorical rather than epistemological. In chapter two, I will explore the historical 
emergence of literacy, noting important developments in the history of written symbolism 
that established an intellectual ‘turning away’ from the sensuous world of our lived 
experience. I will also explore the concepts that emerged from developments in reading 
and writing that created the space for Cartesian schisms between mind/body, 
subject/object, inside/outside, and other dualisms. Finally, I will finish the chapter by 
submitting a different diagrammatic conception of literacy and illiteracy that doesn’t rely 
on binaries, but rather posits an indefinite number of different literacies, all of which are 
predicated on a symbolism that is affectively aesthetic. The concept of affective 
symbolism allows for literacy and illiteracy to be understood as immanent to each other, 
essentially flattened horizontally, rather than layered vertically with literacy above 
illiteracy.  
Following this exploration of the history of literacy and my reconceptualization of 
literacy and illiteracy, I define two ways of being in chapter three: being-scriptural, and 
being-ascriptural. I hope to substitute these concepts for conventional definitions of 
literacy and illiteracy. In this chapter, I work to offer a new way of thinking and talking 
about the dominant form of literacy (the one I’m engaged in as I write this), which I call 
scripturality. I argue that it is a specific kind of literacy that has evolved as one form of 
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symbolism on a wide spectrum of potential symbolisms, and that even within 
scripturality there are an indefinite number of degrees of intensity and competency which 
correlate with aesthetic experiences that transversely cross human society and the more-
than-human-world. Specifically, I reference the work done by Michel de Certeau to 
discuss being-scriptural and bring in voices of people who were once unable to read or 
write to discuss being-ascriptural. The anecdotes provided by these once functionally 
ascriptural (or less competently scriptural) people will expose similarities and continuities 
(and important differences) between being-scriptural and being-ascriptural, situated as 
both are within a specific historic context of literacy.  
Chapter four offers a more in-depth exploration of the symbolic implications of 
re-situating literacy and illiteracy onto a horizontal axis that is fundamentally aesthetic. In 
this chapter, I introduce the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead as integral to my 
understanding of symbolism, specifically that rather than symbolism being a marker of 
thought, it is a co-traveler with ontology. I also argue for the metaphysics behind my 
diagrammatic reconceptualization of literacy and illiteracy: that all things are affected by 
the larger world, meaning that ontology is inherently aesthetic, and so all things therefore 
engage in symbolism that is based in feeling regardless of sentient complexity. This 
premise has consequences for how we currently think about our own bounded-ness as a 
body, how we think about rhetoric, and how we think about symbolisms in general. My 
main thesis in this chapter is that we must establish the symbolic as always, at minimum, 
a symbolic of affect.  
After describing the metaphysics of symbolism and affect behind my 
reconceptualization of literacy and illiteracy, in chapter five I will consider the ethical 
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implications such a re-orientation introduces. I will explore the consequences a symbolic 
of affect has on the way in which we talk about, interact with, and relate to nature, 
ourselves as bodies, others as bodies, and communities. Specifically, I argue that these 
relations are not binaries, but continuities and sites of exposure that directly implicate an 
ethic of responsiveness and being response-able. Further, I argue that an ethical 
orientation to response-ability, to being accepting and open to otherness, calls for a 
paradigm shift in the way we teach reading and writing. At the conclusion of the chapter, 
I argue for the need to utilize existing modes of writing to create lines of exposure in 
which binaries and boundaries are exceeded and new forms of connectivity can be felt.   
Lastly, in the final chapter, I will take a turn towards a new type of pedagogy. I 
argue that the classroom needs to be reconceptualized and reorganized to explore all 
instantiations of the symbolic – but especially reading and writing – as experiences that 
expose the inherent aesthetic connectivity between all things. Premised on the theoretical 
work preceding it, I suggest some potential moves that could begin the work of shifting 
discussion and teaching of literacy from literacy as a skill-set, to literacy as a way of 
being.  
Having laid out the steps I make in this thesis, it must be stated that I won’t be 
offering any clearly organized models for a new pedagogy of literacy. I simply don’t 
have the time or the knowledge of existing models of literacy pedagogy to offer a new, 
improved model for literacy pedagogy that could be implemented at the level of 
educational policy. This thesis is, I hope, the beginning of my trying to connect literacy 
and rhetorical theory so as to improve both fields of study – ultimately leading to my 
being able to suggest pragmatic, pedagogical methodologies that could, someday, 
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improve composition studies and the way in which we rhetorically discuss and think 
about literacy and illiteracy. In the following pages, I attempt to establish a landscape of 
concepts and relationships that I hope to bring with me into future work as I continue to 
explore the connections between rhetoric, literacy studies, materialism, pedagogy, and the 
symbolic.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
DIAGNOSIS: FEELING THE BOUNDARY & THE DICHOTOMY 
 
On page one of his work, The Domestication of the Savage Mind, Goody writes 
that “the trouble with the categories is that they are rooted in a we/they division which is 
both binary and ethnocentric, each of these features being limiting in their own way.”9 
And indeed, this thesis is dedicated to plumbing the depth of that division between the 
concepts of literacy and illiteracy: I attempt to excavate the negative, conceptual darkness 
of what it means to be illiterate by bringing it out into the light so as to inform how we 
talk about – and teach – literacy. This is to say that literacy is often thought of as a skill-
set – an ability to read and write in the dominant language of one’s socio-historical 
milieu. Illiteracy, on the other hand, is often thought of as a lack – an absence of a 
necessary skill-set that influences how well one can work and communicate (via reading 
and writing) within their dominant language and their society. Illiteracy seems to have 
been defined through its relationship to the definition of literacy, that is, as a “negative-
literacy” or a “not-literacy” that erects, as Goody reminds us, a division between the 
“literate-body” and the “illiterate-body.” To echo Eva-Maria Simms, “I have always 
wondered what other abilities of our children’s perception, imagination, feeling, and 
cognition we have sacrificed when we taught them how to read.”10 I ask, in tracing the 
fault-lines between literacy and illiteracy through time: “what is lost?” In what ways do 
																																																						
9	Goody, The Domestication of the Savage Mind, 1.  
10	Simms, Questioning the Value of Literacy, 21.  
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we see a change in the way humanity thought about itself as it adopted iterations of 
literacy through time? Where are there paradigm shifts that change the concepts such as 
embodiment, or community, or inside vs. outside? These types of questions will be kept 
in mind as I work through the history of writing and literacy – noting spots that seem to 
contradict what arguably today is the popularized definition of literacy: “both a cognitive 
and a social condition, the ability to participate actively in a community of readers who 
have agreed on some principle of reading, a hermeneutics if you will, a set of texts to be 
treated as significant and a working agreement on the appropriate or valid 
interpretation(s) of those texts.”11 Such a definition, as etymology shows us, will 
necessarily have made shifts in context. It will be important to take note of these 
slippages and see what such historical movements show us – what kinds of echoes or 
shadows these shifts are still producing, just outside today’s thought.   
 
Historically: Literacy and Illiteracy Through Time 
 
 David Abram, in his work The Spell of the Sensuous, writes that “our first writing, 
clearly, was our own tracks, our footprints, our handprints in mud or ash pressed upon the 
rock.”12 In what I see as a particularly rich setting, Abram is situating us back into the 
body, and more generally, the body as embedded and continuous with what he calls the 
“more-than-human-world.” In working out from the footprint and making the connection 
to Sausserian signifiers, Abram writes that “Later, perhaps, we found that by copying the 
																																																						
11	Olsen, The World on Paper,  
12	Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous, 96.  
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distinctive prints and scratches made by other animals we could gain a new power… [that 
is] identifying with the other animal, taking on its expressive magic in order to learn … 
these are ways of placing oneself in distant contact with the Other.”13 Situating us back 
into the body in regard to writing shows us that writing is undergirded by a necessary 
inter-connectedness. Such connectivity rubs up against the binaries of subject-object, 
inside-outside, thought/mind-body. Dichotomous, neat organizations of ways of tracing 
influence and affect begin to coalesce and muddle together when we start at the 
beginning of the history of writing and inscription. This chapter traces the historic 
emergence of literacy and illiteracy as concepts that suppose a dichotomously organized 
reference to a yes (she can read and write) or no (she can’t read and write) binary. It can 
be argued that the emergence of alphabetical language – and by extension, literacy – 
created an ontological separation between the human-world and the more-than-human-
world, effectively allowing there to be a conceptual negative space that allowed for a 
negative definition of what illiteracy really is. Literacy begins to be associated with an 
understanding of language as – only – a human construct and creation, rather than 
something that emerges from a synesthetic, lived-experience. Of course, literacy in 
general has allowed there to be an incredible freedom of abstraction and rational 
speculation, but as abstractions begin to breed abstractions, complexity becomes 
inevitable and, sometimes, indelible. The payoff in following the history of writing and 
inscription and literacy is to problematize this dualism.  
To start at the beginning of writing’s history is to show that there were no 
conceptual binaries; the kind of pictographic system of inscription we’ve already referred 
																																																						
13	Ibid., 96.  
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to is a reminder of Egyptian hieroglyphics, which, according to Abram and his sources, 
“first appeared during the First Dynasty, around 3000 B.C.E. and remained in use until 
the second century C.E.”14 In continuing the “tradition” of human communication 
emerging from an embeddedness in the “more-than-human-world,” many of these 
hieroglyphics represented humans as always interacting with other types of plants and 
animals and objects found in the world. These types of markings and images – which 
were also utilized in China in the early fifteenth century B.C.E., as well as in 
Mesoamerica in the sixth century B.C.E. – usually included “ideograms.” An ideogram, 
Abram writes, is “often a pictorial character that refers not to the visible entity that it 
explicitly pictures, but to some quality or other phenomenon readily associated with that 
entity.”15 For example – to invent what may have been an ideogram – a tortoise with four 
legs may have signified ‘patience,’ while only a shell shown may have signified 
‘protection.’  
 What’s particularly important about these ideograms for the purpose of tracing the 
history of literacy is that they are the first instance of a paradigm shift in the way humans 
communicate and understand other things and themselves. Instead of relying on voices 
and noises made by other humans and other organisms, humans were recursively 
referring back to symbols they had made and etched into a tablet, or onto a wall. Of 
course, these ideograms still were interconnected with the larger, sensuous world of 
experience and reminded the viewers of their embeddedness in (and indebtedness to) that 
world – effectively “keeping the world (literally) in mind” for humans. But as thought 
																																																						
14	Ibid., 97.  
15	Ibid., 97.  
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became more complex, human experiences of the world demanded written symbols to 
keep up with the evolution of the ideograms. The only problem was that there weren’t 
any ideograms that represented these abstract concepts and experiences: for example, try 
coming up with an ideogram that adequately captures the verb “to believe.”  
The way in which to get around this, as scribes practiced, was to use pictographic 
puns – think of an image of a “bee” and a “leaf” as referencing the concept of believing. 
These were called “rebuses,” as Abram explains, and they were employed by “scribes in 
ancient China and in Mesoamerica, as well as in the Middle East, to record certain terms 
that were especially amorphous or resistant to visual representation.”16 This innovation, 
over time, gave rise to “syllabaries” where sound-syllables, as they were captured by 
rebuses, began to be recorded and turned into original words, and in turn, by around the 
“1500 B.C.E.”17 the Semitic scribes created characters or “letters” based off of the “silent 
consonantal elements [of every syllable of their language] plus an element of sounded 
breath – that which we would today call a vowel.”18 These syllabaries laid the foundation, 
then, for what would become the alphabet.  
 This new aleph-beth, created by the Semites, effectively created a character, or 
letter, for each consonant of their language, while the vowels – or the sounded breath 
added to the written consonants – had to be an extemporaneous choice of the reader. This 
aleph-beth, which reduced the sounded consonants for the many different symbols being 
used at the time down to just twenty-two, was soon picked up and used not just by the 
Hebrews, but by the Phoenicians, the Aramaeans, the Greeks, the Romans, and, as Abram 
																																																						
16	Ibid., 99.  
17	Ong, Orality and Literacy, 89.  
18	Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous, 99.  
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writes, “eventually gave rise (directly or indirectly) to virtually every alphabet known.”19 
Here is where the next paradigm shift in how literacy occurs, separating the human from 
the “more-than-human-world.” As we noted for the first shift, the pictographic symbols 
used for the hieroglyphics almost always referred the “reader” back to the world “out 
there” and the necessary connection between thoughts, actions, and the environment. 
With the advent of the phonetic aleph-beth, however, the characters began to refer only to 
the sounds made by the human mouth. This means, then, that there started to emerge a 
dramatic shift away from any sort of sensible phenomenon that the symbol was actively 
representing to what Abram calls “the shape of the utterance itself, now invoked directly 
by the written character.”20 The things(s) referred to started to become no longer 
necessary; the human utterances and sounds being made were starting to become directly 
inspired by human-made signs. As Abram writes, “the larger, more-than-human-life-
world is no longer a part of the semiotic, no longer a necessary part of the system.”21  
It is in this move past the hieroglyphic, pictographic rebuses and the incorporation 
of the aleph-beth where the connection between the world and the body as the foundation 
for the linguistic and the symbolic begins to fall away and language begins to become a 
function of “human reason.” Language, as the Bible reminds us, was beginning to be a 
purely human power: one which gave the human being dominion over that which he or 
she saw.22 And this “falling” away from the sensuous world was exacerbated by the 
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Greek scribes when they appropriated the phonetic aleph-beth of the Semites, and made it 
their own with slight modification around the eighth century B.C.E.23 As Abram writes, 
“Thus, aleph – the name of the first letter and the Hebrew word for ‘ox’ – became alpha; 
beth – the name of the second letter, as well as the word for ‘house’ – became beta; gimel 
– the third letter, and the word for “camel”, became gamma, etc.”24 These names had 
older, nongrammatological histories and sources – they emerged from the much more 
complex relationship with a more-than-human-world. The shift taken by the Greeks here 
allowed for this indebtedness to the world to fall away from language and the roots of 
(what became under the Greeks) the alphabet.  
 Interestingly, however, as the literacy historian Eric Havelock notes, for the first 
two or three centuries after the alphabet made its appearance in Greece, it wasn’t widely 
practiced or desired. He writes, “the alphabet was an interloper, lacking social standing 
and achieved use. The elite of society were all reciters and performers.”25 It wasn’t until 
the first two written texts were produced in Greece – the Iliad and the Odyssey – that 
literacy became more diffuse. This was because, for the first time in Greece, the literate 
culture was allying itself with the oral tradition. And indeed, the Homeric epics were oral 
creations – a fact uncovered by the work of Harvard classicist Milman Parry and his 
assistant Albert Lord.26 This achievement – transcribing the Homeric epics into 
documents – acted as the catalyst for the proliferation of literacy. A change, too, in the 
way communication was understood and thought about was also influenced by this 
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specific popularization of written texts in the vowel-laden Greek texts. As Havelock 
writes, “It is only as language is written down that it becomes possible to think about it 
… the alphabetized document, the medium became objectified … no longer just a 
function of ‘me’ the speaker, but a document with an independent existence.”27 With the 
proliferation of literacy in mind – happening a few centuries after the eighth century – 
Abram notes that we can see the influence of the “literate” mindset on the pre-Socratic 
philosophers who were writing during the sixth and fifth centuries B.C.E. For example, 
one may think of the written fragments of philosophers such as Heraclitus, Empedocles, 
or Thales. As Abram writes, “these thinkers are still under the sway of the oral-poetic 
mode of discourse – their teachings are commonly couched in an aphoristic or poetic 
form… [yet] they seem to stand at a new distance from the natural order, their thoughts 
inhabiting a different mode of temporality from the flux of nature.”28 There seems to be a 
tension between that which gives rise to the world one can write about, and the recursive 
thoughts themselves coming, one feels, strictly from human reason. As Thales writes, “all 
things are full of gods,”29 a fragment that exposes a literate, poetic reflection on a more-
than-human-world that feels to Thales like it’s full of immanent powers and divine 
energies.   
 Literacy, however, would gain a stronger hold on the oral-poetic imagination. By 
the fourth century B.C.E. – which, coincidentally was during Plato’s lifetime (428 – 348 
B.C.E.) – the alphabet had begun to be widely incorporated into Athenian life. As Illich 
and Sanders write, “Plato, in the early fourth century B.C., stands on the threshold 
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between the oral and written cultures of Greece. The earliest epigraphic and iconographic 
indications of young boys being taught to write date from Plato’s childhood.”30 Such a 
time in the development of the human intellect – i.e. when literacy was just becoming 
widely taught – is made that much more fascinating when we juxtapose the philosophies 
of Socrates, a largely non-literate philosopher, and his student, the literate Plato. This 
association, Abram brings out, could very well exemplify the “hinge on which the 
sensuous, mimetic, profoundly embodied style of consciousness proper to orality gave 
way to a more detached, abstract mode of thinking engendered by alphabetic 
literacy.”31To think of Socrates is to think of his method or dialectic in which he would 
interrupt or aggressively question his interlocutors so as to get them to break out of their 
mnemonic, oral spell. This method, for Socrates, allowed for conversations to become 
emerging events that were tied up with the environment and the people participating. Of 
course, Socrates still desired to get at what, say, virtue was in the pure abstract, but he 
(Socrates) kept to excavating moral concepts or qualities – that is to say, ephemeral 
qualities that couldn’t be correlated with exactly one situation or object in the world. For 
Plato, on the other hand, one thinks of his notion of the “Platonic Ideas” – those eternal 
essences of things that all material instantiations are continually bent towards. In Plato’s 
philosophy, there’s the “idea” of a tree, and all trees in the world are only copies or 
shadows of the essence (or idea) of what a tree is. In a very real way, then, there’s an 
equivalence between Plato’s Ideas and the written words themselves. Both the letters in 
the alphabet and the Platonic Ideas do not exist in the world outside of the human 
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intellect. Rather, both inspire a sort of epistemological and aesthetic impetus that springs 
forth from the material of the world and overlays it like a dust.  
 This connection between the Platonic Ideas and alphabetic literacy has major 
implications for the way in which we conceive of the mind as informed by a “literate 
reason” versus a mind informed by an “animistic reason.” Recall the earliest pictographic 
signs utilized for inscription and communication. These signs – while “caught” and 
concretized on a type of surface – still were directly inspired by organisms and objects in-
the-world, effectively reminding the viewers or “readers” that there was still a connection 
between any type of communication and the environment in which that communication 
was taking – or had taken – place. When the Greeks appropriated the aleph-beth, 
however, and included vowels (creating the alphabet) there was a double removal in 
regards to the signs themselves still being connected to – and reminding the “readers” of 
– the more-than-human-world. Rather than signs standing in as directly related to animals 
and natural phenomena (e.g. the moon, the sun, the wind, etc.) the words became the 
sounds of the words – readers began to “hear” the words, rather than see and feel the 
roots or objects of the words. The words also became in a very real sense invincible: 
removed from the ravages of time and tempestuous space and able to be, once recorded, 
returned to in their pristine form. This kind of recursive, reflexive awareness was called 
by Socrates and Plato the psyche. As Abram writes, “For Plato, as for Socrates, the 
psyche is now that aspect of oneself that is refined and strengthened by turning away 
from the ordinary sensory world in order to contemplate the intelligible Ideas, the pure 
and eternal forms that, alone, truly exist.”32 The Socratic-Platonic psyche becomes the 
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“literate intellect” and the beginning of the schism opened up in language about what it 
means to be literate, versus what it means to be illiterate.  
 This massive paradigm shift is entwined with the advent of literacy, and yet many 
twentieth-century scholars hardly consider the impact literacy had on the human’s 
understanding of her being-in-the-world. Indeed, the work of Havelock, Illich, Ong, and 
others with whom I’ve been working all seem to comment on the way in which phonetic 
writing influences societal structures, patterns of cognition, and/or the way in which it 
has influenced human language. While these topics are all important, what’s left out is 
the way in which the phonetic alphabet has actually influenced the way in which we 
interact with the organisms situated within this world. Abram writes that, “[this kind of 
study of the alphabet] itself reflects an anthropocentric bias wholly endemic to alphabetic 
culture. In the absence of phonetic literacy, neither society, nor language, nor even the 
experience of ‘thought’ or consciousness can be pondered in the isolation from the 
multiple nonhuman shapes and powers that lend their influence to all activities.”33 
Indeed, there is a continuity with the wider-world that seems to be, at least in part, 
severed when the written word began to diffuse and influence important philosophical 
thought and the ways in which societies wrote about themselves. The next questions to 
raise, then, are what kinds of ways, conceptually, changes occurred, due to the literacy 
that influenced the organization of epistemology and ontology.  
 
Conceptually: Inside/Outside & Thought 
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Literacy is a valuable tool and way of being. As Goody writes, “Literacy is 
absolutely necessary for the development not only of science, but also of history, 
philosophy, explicate understanding of literature and of any art, and indeed for the 
explanation of language itself.”34 And yet there’s still a sense in which something is 
“lost” in this move towards entering into the “spell” of literacy, by learning how to 
“spell.” Or perhaps what it is isn’t so much lost as it is buried – sequestered to the 
shadow cast by the words that come from literate culture itself. Words have a visual 
presence – a materiality that sound lacks. Sound, speaking and listening and reacting, are 
an event, just like emotions. They come and overwhelm us, or come out of us, and then 
pass by. There’s a visceral magic to this kind of happening: I need go no further in 
coming up with an example than referencing any kind of musical experience the reader 
may have had. Sound – and by extension words, speech, rhetoric, music – is dynamic: it 
affects and makes a change to the very essence of a kairotic (opportune or eventful) 
moment. On the other hand, writing can be conservative: keeping track of lists, thoughts, 
dates, notes – but in return, as Havelock notes, “[writing also] enables the mind to turn 
itself to new speculation.”35 
 One of the ways in which this “new way of speculating” manifested itself was 
through the syllogism: i.e. when a conclusion is drawn from two or more given premises 
or propositions. A.R. Luria, in his work Cognitive Development: Its Cultural and Social 
Foundations, noted that when he attempted to teach illiterate students principles of 
abstract classification, they were unable to operate with formal deductive procedures of 
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reasoning, and instead would revert to situational rather than categorical thinking. This is 
to say that, yes, while syllogistic thinking relates to thought, in day-to-day goings on – 
i.e. “practical” matters – people rarely think in syllogisms. For example, logical 
abstraction, layered on top of actual organisms and objects in the world was difficult for 
Luria’s students: from as “advanced” as the syllogism, to as “simple” as geometric 
shapes. As Ong writes, “a circle would be called a plate, sieve, bucket, watch or moon.”36 
The same sort of difficulty surrounding abstraction applied to self-awareness, too. Since 
self-analysis requires an ability to intellectually fall away from the present moment and 
reflect back on a sense of self – removed from the specific moment in time and space – 
illiterates who hadn’t had much experience with any sort of written texts had a hard time 
talking about, what was for them, effectively the center of their every experience: i.e. 
their body. When Ong spoke to a middle-aged peasant man who had been born and raised 
in an oral community and asked him what sort of person he thought he was, he answered 
as follows: “What can I say about my own heart? How can I talk about my character? 
Ask others, they can tell you about me. I myself can’t say anything.”37 In this exchange, 
we see how the oral (but also illiterate) man feels a strong sense of connectivity to others, 
and understands that how and who he is, is just as much how he makes people feel, as it 
is what kinds of decisions he makes.  
 Of course, to make a clean conceptual split between the outside and the inside as 
it correlates with the emergence of literacy and illiteracy would be a deductive fallacy, as 
Goody reminds us. He writes that the “written word does not replace speech, any more 
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than speech replaces gesture. But it adds an important dimension to such social action.”38 
In other words, the differences in the way in which writing influences organizations, 
societal constructs, actions, and, to an extent, thought, is due to the fact that literacy is a 
different communicative act, tethered to different ways of viewing the world and different 
skills that maximize or make vestigial other ways of relating to the world. In a pre-literate 
society, as we’ve mapped, there seems to be more of a chance of the society swallowing 
up the individual and influencing – in an obvious way that exceeds, or perhaps precedes 
concepts such as interpolation – an individual’s thoughts about themselves. Here, we see 
the importance of rhetoric through time, as Goody explains how “culture is a series of 
communicative acts, and differences in the modes of communication are often as 
important as differences in the modes of production, for they involve developments in the 
storing, analysis, and creation of human knowledge, as well as the relationships between 
the individuals involved.”39 On one hand, what literacy does as a mode of communication 
is encourage criticism and irony, while, on the other hand, reify the importance of the 
book and all “knowledge,” e.g. dates, notes, thoughts that were written down. As such, 
epistemology moves further away from the animate world and deeper into the conceptual 
framework actively being created as the culture of each literate society continues to 
produce, experience, and concretize.  
 More individualistically and not as socially, even the concepts of inside and 
outside are necessarily tautological. One might here think of Derrida’s thoughts in his 
work, For Hospitality, in which he deconstructs the concepts of “home” and “guest” as 
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falling apart when put under the microscope – inevitably having parts of what they aren’t 
already inhering in their meaning. Ong will similarly critique the concepts of “inside” and 
“outside,” writing that, “interior is defined by ‘in’ which is defined by ‘between’ which is 
defined by ‘inside’ and so on round and round the tautological circle.”40 And yet there 
has absolutely been, throughout the history of philosophy and by extension colloquial 
thought, a real belief in what Newton saw as absolute space: an “out-there” that exists 
and is completely removed from an “us” or an “inside.”41 There’s a way in which literacy 
has played a part in opening up a different way of engaging with the world and with each 
other. Ong writes that “after print and the extensive experience with maps that print 
implemented … human beings, when they thought about the cosmos or the universe or 
‘world’ would think primarily of something laid out before their eyes … ready to be 
explored.”42 And a very large part of this phenomenon is due to the emergence of 
“context-free” language (Hirsch, 1977, pp. 21-3, 26) and “autonomous discourse” (Olson, 
1980a) all due to literacy. That is to say that, with literacy, there’s a sense in which words 
can reverberate with each other endlessly without exhausting themselves, all words 
reflexively referring to more signifieds, synonyms, symbols, without allowing the human 
to attune themselves to the environment or the Other so as to get a literal and 
metaphorical grounding.  
 Coincidentally, it’s exactly this emergence of “context-free” language that also 
evolved the major discipline of ancient rhetoric. As Ong writes, “in ancient Greece, the 
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study of ‘philosophy,’ represented by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, for all its subsequent 
fecundity, was a relatively minor element in the total Greek culture, never competitive 
with rhetoric either in the number of its practitioners, nor in its immediate social 
effects.”43 Around this time – a time dominated by orality and extemporaneous 
communication – rhetoric was at the heart of all things public: public speaking, oral 
address, and political announcement. Ong describes how rhetoric’s history was couched 
in proving or disproving a point against an opposing point: effectively, then, rhetoric was 
a sense of discovery and ‘invention’ – finding in an argument – and in the context in 
which the argument was taking place – a way in which to lodge and defend your own 
beliefs. In Quintillian’s terms, this was considered the “seat” of an argument: the topoi 
(or places; ‘loci’ in Latin) of an argument, or that which inspired an argument or 
discussion, and were called, as Ong writes, “the loci communes or commonplaces when 
they were thought of as providing arguments common to any and all subject matter.”44  
 Over time, however, as the “literate mindset” influenced ancient pedagogical 
practices – and communication practices in turn – rhetoric shifted from the oral world to 
the choreographic, literate world, and by the sixteenth century rhetoric text books were, 
according to Ong, omitting the “memory” part of the traditional five parts of rhetoric: 
invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. As Ong notes, rhetoric, like 
pedagogy and the way in which humans thought about their relationship with the greater 
world seemed to “[follow] the drift of consciousness away from an oral to a writing 
economy.”45 And this drift was exacerbated by the emergence of the printing press, an 
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invention which reified the materiality of words as it aided literacy in becoming more 
diffuse. This kind of shift in the means of producing the written word both encouraged 
the belief in knowledge as a quantifiable, empirical resource that could be read and 
consumed (as well as sold), and influenced the way in which the human psyche expected 
the sensuous world to be organized: e.g. the loci became “headers,” “titles,” “paragraphs” 
to be read from left to right, and so on.  
 This kind of dramatic shift in the expectation humans had of visual experience – 
and by extension, the way in which knowledge and “valuable” experience could be 
collected – encouraged, as Ong writes, “human beings to think of their own interior 
conscious and unconscious resources as more and more thing-like, impersonal and 
religiously neutral. Print encouraged the mind to sense that its possessions were held in 
some sort of inert mental space.”46 Of course, this isn’t to say that there’s a differentiation 
in the way in which we as human beings physically experience the world writ large: both 
as an illiterate-body and as a literate-body. Both ways of being are still completely 
immersed in the visual, tactile, sensuous world that is mediated through our sensory 
modalities. No, the difference is that of a gradation of affect, not a separation of affect. 
This is to say that the distribution of what we can sense – in other words, the distribution 
of the sensible – is recursively categorized and “thought” about fundamentally differently 
(in degrees) if one is literate, compared to if one is illiterate. And this difference in 
degrees provides the necessary space for the mind of the literate to recursively and 
discursively construct an “inner” space, removed from the “outer” world, that 
pantomimes the demarcations and limits of the book: i.e. knowledge is inside and neatly 
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organized – it can be opened and added to (via writing) but necessarily needs a certain 
kind of validation or wrapping to be considered legitimate. In other words, the 
dependence on institutional power-approved legitimacy becomes that much more 
dangerous as the printing of the word and what can not-so-hyperbolically be called the 
production of knowledge becomes more widely conventional. The word effectively 
became a commodity and the practice of silent reading, of silent communication removed 
from the environment and the limits of the page, contributed to the importance of 
endings, of complacence, of feeling a sense of closure when being told to stop thinking, 
or reading, or writing. These kinds of limits – of the end, of the beginning, of the middle 
– not the least of which was the limit of inside and outside of the human psyche and of 
human experience, support what Hartman will call, “thinking as textual,” but as he 
writes, it’s important to remember that “texts are false bottoms… text is fundamentally 
pretext.”47 
 All of this is to say that language and literacy has become a structure – an 
assemblage – through which multiple powers run, and from within which various kinds 
of literacies can be created and experienced: like windows one looks through or doors 
through which one enters, seeing and feeling entirely new and different layers of reality. 
And the metaphor of windows, of porousness, is an important inclusion when speaking of 
literacy and language in architectural metaphors. There are no closed systems, and there 
never have been, Ong reminds us – and this includes language and literacy. Yes, the way 
in which the human feels herself in the cosmos has become more complex over time, 
allowing for a symbolic recursivity that isn’t natural to the oral or illiterate world. It must 
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be remembered, however, that the illusion that reason, language, or logic is a closed 
system is just that, an illusion exacerbated by the way in which things necessarily have to 
become actualized in the world: as materially bounded instantiations always slipping into 
and out of affective states of resonance.  
 And this illusion of a closed system was and continues to be especially dependent 
on the literate as he or she fills positions of social power and leverages visual, literate 
symbolic organizations such as the table, the list, and the box so as to validate the literate 
way of thinking, thereby reinforcing a dichotomy between inside and outside, “primitive” 
and “advanced,” and ultimately “literate” and “illiterate.” But this dichotomy isn’t 
necessary, as Goody writes. In fact, it’s inadequate to dealing with the complexity of 
development and experience, and “proposes no reason for the difference(s) [experienced 
in the world] and no mechanisms for change. [Change that inevitably happens.]48 
It doesn’t necessarily have to be this way. Even though the notion of literacy has 
been set against our bodily experience of the world – with our experience of the world 
having been inverted so as to be purportedly described more accurately through a 
“transcendental logos” – there’s a way in which to trace the fault-lines of our concepts 
and open them up so as to create a larger space for literacies (which would also always 
already include notions of various illiteracies). Each of which would be understood as 
informing and influencing other kinds of literacy, and in turn influencing the way in 
which the world affects us in each sensuous or remembered (intellectual) moment. Of 
course, re-planting literacy back into the more-than-human-world would also demand a 
change in the way we talk about and describe our experience of our bodies situated in 
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these assemblages of power, of which the most powerful depends on literacy-as-
transcendence.   
To re-examine the body as situated in a literate-world, it is necessary to follow the 
way in which there are now different modes of being that act as lived-experiences: being-
scriptural in one vein, and being-ascriptural in the other. This isn’t to say that being-
scriptural, or more generally scripturality, is the same as being-literate, just as I’m not 
saying that being-asciptural is the same as being-illiterate. Rather, being-scriptural can be 
understood as being able to convey specific information, a way in which one engages in a 
socio-economic symbolicity that demands successful receiving and sending of accepted 
texts with the goal of participating in an economic ecosystem that’s been created and 
constructed. Literacy, on the other hand, is a fundamental way of being: concomitant with 
ontology and symbolism – an intensification of ontology and symbolism in which 
symbols writ large are felt in a different way, and not necessarily engaged in a 
constructed economic ecosystem or even a specific kind of sociology. Further, illiteracy 
can be understood as any kind of lesser aesthetic intensification of the symbolic within a 
specific kind of literacy and the inability to tap into the aesthetic resonance of other kinds 
of literacy, whereas a-scripturality is the inability to participate in the kind of socio-
economic symbolicity that is obligatory to textual symbol and sign usage within the kind 
of literacy that organizes this thesis.  
The kind of relationship I’m referring to here between literacy/illiteracy and 
being-scriptural/being-ascriptural can be conceptualized as a graph in which there is an 
“x-axis” (the horizontal axis), and a “y-axis” (the vertical axis). The horizontal axis, in 
my use of these concepts, is all of reality, including all things that exist and that 
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participate in various kinds of literacies. There, on this horizontal axis, an indefinite 
number of organisms that all are aesthetically influenced and “influence-able” are 
participating in an infinite number of symbolisms and, by extension, literacies. Some 
organisms are more complex than others and have various kinds of aesthetic prehensions 
which shape their ability to formulate new literacies. As a result, being-scriptural is one 
kind of literacy that is particularly complex for the human being due to how systemically 
impactful it is in most societies today (for the accumulation of both monetary and cultural 
capital), and the kind of history of change it has, while being literate in the language of, 
say, trees is demonstrably different, with an entirely different assemblage on the 
horizontal axis, emanating from an entirely different organism (a tree versus a human). 
Put simply, being-scriptural is one mode of literacy on a horizontal plane of literacy and 
symbolicity: one that, as I’ve said, has a complex assemblage that correlates with the 
vertical axis, and that has a profound intensity to it. 
The vertical axis, then, is the way in which each individual organism experiences 
its own being on the horizontal axis of symbols and affect where being-scriptural is but 
one way in which to experience one’s own literacy. This is to say that all things exist and 
participate on a horizontal plane of ontological symbolicity, but each individual organism 
doesn’t experience itself as existing on an ever-expanding and horizontal plane, but rather 
experiences a vertical relationship that grows out of that horizontal plane. Imagine a piece 
of fabric laid flat out. Then imagine pinching together a section of that fabric so that a 
ridge is created. This is the kind of relationship I’m envisioning. Literacies are vertical 
experiences of immanent potential, organizations of infused value that depend upon the 
type of other organisms surrounding and coalescing around the individual organism as 
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it’s situated on the horizontal plane of ontology and various symbolism, and which create 
a kind of aesthetic and material milieu in which the individual organism exists and 
develops.  
In other words, the verticality produced on the horizontal plane is inevitable as 
things exist and feel and move; we all experience various literacies as vertical – some 
more strongly and reified, with a longer history, than others. But that isn’t to say that the 
verticality of each experienced literacy is the only way in which to experience literacy 
writ large; rather, there are an indefinite number of other literacies that one can 
potentiality experience and that inevitably contribute to the way in which any one 
specific kind of literacy is experienced and possible. And this is all aesthetically 
connected and influenced, which is what constitutes the horizontality as such – since 
movement on the y-axis can only ever occur by virtue of organisms being open 
aesthetically, and thus symbolically, to influence the ontological connectedness 
represented by the x-axis, which accounts for the ability of entities to change and evolve 
into complex organisms that can formulate increasingly complex literacies. The aesthetic 
is, arguably in my conception, the scalars of the vector space I’m mapping out, that which 
allows there to be communication and continual production between the many different 
interactions between these axes. This must, then, also include a z-axis, which runs 
perpendicular to the two dimensional organization of the x-axis and y-axis, and which 
gives the verticality of the y-axis a certain profound intensity, a thickness that accounts 
for the intensification of a particular literacy, such as something like the history of the 
scripturality of our current socio-economic milieu. The z-axis is the conception of other 
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universes and worlds of literacies: intensities that allow for there to be new layers of 
experiencing a specific kind of literacy.  
And these intensities are porous; in other words, it’s not necessarily the x-axis that 
comes before the y-axis. Rather, it’s the movements of all things – which inevitability 
create verticalities – that make up the x-axis, and the z-axis is the unknown number of 
versions of the same sort of literacy you can experience through space-time, and that are 
being influenced by other literacies as well, no matter the depth you go in it or the 
profundity of the intensity to which you feel it. Think of an ocean. As you get deeper, it 
gets darker, more difficult to move around depending on the kind of sensory apparatuses 
you have available to you: both biologically and technologically. But it’s still the ocean: 
coextensive with the rest of the many infinite layers and areas of the ocean. The same 
with literacy. 
What I’m trying to say is part of the reason why I’m even able to make this 
argument, that literacy and illiteracy need to be collapsed into each other, that the 
bifurcation needs to be dismantled, is because we’ve confused the history of symbolism 
and by extension literacy with ontology. We’re deep into scriptural literacy and its 
abstract power. We’ve created modes of being-scriptural that reflect our intense positions 
(on the z-axis) as we’ve continued to move along the y-axis, vertically. There are many 
implications to this depth, but one important consequence is that we’ve allowed this 
evolved symbolism – this literacy, and this specific kind of literacy (scripturality) to fill 
the space where we believe we get our information, where we search for truth and 
knowledge. The space we open ourselves up to isn’t the emotional or the affective or the 
aesthetic, anymore. The slope of our history of literacy, the cavernous creation of our 
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ivory towers and economic ecosystems, always already depends on a relationship 
between the y-axis (the organized lived experiences of things) and the x-axis (things in 
their mutual actuality), which are allowed to create a current or an arc because of the 
aesthetic scalars firing at all times.  
Literacy, then, is always already horizontal and vertical and of indefinite scope 
and intensity. This chapter is about the historical emergence (or even the historical 
intensification) of a specific kind of vertical relationship to a certain kind of literacy 
(being-scriptural), that influences the way in which we think about and feel our own 
ontology. But the hope is to travel through the porousness of these literacies to show that 
there are always aesthetic scalars exploding and arcing with each other, and because of 
these aesthetic explosions there are ways to enter into new ways of feeling, and thinking 
about, literacy. The next chapter will trace the ways in which the two modes of being 
we’ve isolated – being-scriptural and being-ascriptural – are in fact co-dependent, and 
when juxtaposed expose different ways in which to orient ourselves towards new ways of 
thinking about literacy and illiteracy.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
MODES OF BEING: SCRIPTURAL & ASCRIPTURAL 
 
 
In this chapter, I explore the two modes of being that I introduced in chapter two 
– being-scriptural and being-ascriptural – and that are a part of the specific kind of 
literacy we experience as human beings. Tracing these two kinds of modes of experience 
(being-scriptural and being-ascriptural) will, I hope, begin to expose the aesthetic arcs 
that undergird both ways of being, and will provide avenues for exploration as we 
continue to search for ways to more conceptually connect the intense experience of being 
literate with the equally intense experience of being illiterate – since both literacy and 
illiteracy are equally influencing the other concurrently. Specifically, these two modes of 
being have been introduced so as to be concepts that can be substituted for how we now, 
colloquially, conceptualize literacy and illiteracy. If you’re literate and exist in the depths 
of being-scriptural, you’re inevitably illiterate in regard to the horizontality of other 
illiteracies. 
 In what follows, I will explore both being-scriptural and being-ascriptural, noting 
the characteristics of being-scriptural that align with David Abram’s retelling of a history 
of separation from the more-than-human-world that the emergence of literacy reified, and 
then tracing the ways in which being-ascriptural always already stays the scriptural-
being: effectively providing an opening for how we may read and write outward, 
leveraging our own recursive literacy so as to try and more intensely feel the horizontality 
of literacy writ large, situated as we are in our ways of being.  
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Modes of Being: Being-Scriptural 
 
Michel de Carteau writes in his work, The Practice of Everyday Life, “It is 
through an analysis of this economy, of its historical implantation, of its rules and the 
instruments of its success – a vast program for which I shall substitute a mere sketch – 
that one can best begin to locate the points at which voices slip into the great book of our 
law.”49 With the scriptural environment  in which we’re currently living, voices – the 
echoes of an orality that used to be dominant – can only seep through, what are now, 
small pores of an almost airtight scriptural economy, situated as it is next to the felt but 
not conceptually captured literacies on the x-axis. And it’s these pores that we must work 
to locate and widen by tracing both modes of being, that of being-scriptural, and being-
ascriptural – encountering these slippages will be the payoff for the exploration within 
our specific vein of literacy.  
 In describing two different terms, however – that of being-scriptural and being-
ascriptural, I’m not here setting up a false binary between literacy and illiteracy – orality 
and writing, scripturality and ascripturality, or language and speech-acts. Rather these 
kinds of conceptual antinomies expose, as de Carteau writes, “a unique origin (a founding 
archeology)”50 that must always come back to the affective body and deal with the 
affective nature of experience itself: the aesthetic movement that gives rise to recognition 
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of both literacy and illiteracy alike. These “unities” (e.g. literacy and illiteracy; orality 
and writing) are the result of what de Carteau calls “reciprocal distinctions within 
successive and interconnected historical (and aesthetic) configurations.”51 These two 
ways of being are situated on an aesthetic gradation – a specific vein of literacy – and the 
inherent tension between the two allows there to be a sort of concretization of actualities 
(and their symbolisms) in the world. One form of literacy will always make it so that 
other forms remain ambiguous and stuck in a nebulous space of indeterminacy, what de 
Certeau calls “a position of inertia, subjection, and opaque resistance.”52 However, this 
nebulous, indeterminate space gives rise to novelty. Think of ascripturality as that which 
surrounds scripturality at the edges. It’s both what brings scripturality into focus (since 
scripturality has to swallow newness and turn it into text), while also being the residue of 
what’s left over, since as scripturality evolves historically it will necessarily ignore and 
discard much of what may experienced.  
 The problem, however is that the tension that allows for movement (from 
ascriptural to scriptural and back again) establishes power relationships that favor one 
mode of being over the other. For instance, today’s dominant forms of communicative 
action are informed by the cultural silos organized by writing: e.g. literature, poetry, film 
(scripts), education, politics (policy writing), etc. This would mean that those who could 
write – who were effectively literate – would have an exponentially better chance at 
infiltrating and influencing the infrastructure of the culture, since the requisite 
navigational skill in the scriptural economy is scriptural literacy.  As de Carteau writes, 
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“The origin is no longer what is narrated, but rather the multiform and murmuring 
activity of producing a text and producing society as a text. ‘Progress’ is scriptural in 
type.”53 In other words, you would only have opportunity to contribute directly to the 
way in which the society progressed by being-scriptural whether that contribution 
occurred in the realm of the sciences, academia, politics, or the “regular” workplace.  
 This makes sense, too, since from a phenomenological point of view being-
scriptural connotes a sense of mastery of “space” and “object” that we don’t read about or 
seem to experience when exploring the histories of those cultures who have been a-
scriptural through time. Michel de Carteau explains how, with writing, one necessarily 
starts with a “blank page,” a surface on which one is expected to inscribe something. This 
action on what he calls the “autonomous surface” is the “Cartesian move of making a 
distinction that initiates, along with a place of writing, the mastery (and isolation) of a 
subject confronted by an object.”54 The ability of writing – and then being able to write 
on a thing, sometimes indelibly – grants the writer (or author) a sense of transcendental 
power that influences how the writer views her being-in-the-world, including her 
relationship with those things that can’t write in the way humans understand writing to be 
and look like. It’s a real sense of power: both practically and ostensibly.   
 Furthermore, the writing itself is a kind of agreed upon system (most often 
described as rationality actualized) that necessarily has been constructed so as to extend 
off the page and influence the very organization of the spaces on which the text can be 
inscribed, effectively re-organizing space itself so that it becomes already “written” and 
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waiting for more “writing.” Writing and being able to write corroborates, then, the desire 
to accumulate the dates, people, and events of the past so as to create a “history,” which 
supports a writing towards the future, analogous to thinking about and anticipating the 
future. For de Certeau, writing becomes “capitalist and conquering,” appropriating those 
whose bodies aren’t “initiated” via education and discourse to a scriptural way of 
thinking and organization that supports the dominate modes of production and 
oppression.  
 This kind of rite of initiation, when diffuse and adopted by the majority, enacts a 
politics that is subtly – and sometimes not so subtly – exclusive, and that influences the 
ideological foundations of what it means to be political and to hold power. This 
ideological significance that necessarily follows from an economy of being-scriptural 
includes, as de Carteau writes, a redefinition of what “truth” is. He writes that “’truth’ no 
longer depends on the attention of a receiver who assimilates himself [sic] to the great 
identifying message. It is the result of work – historical, critical, economic work… 
[dependent] on a ‘will to do.’”55 Truth and being, in this conceptualization of reality, 
become synonymous with modes of production closely tied to capitalism, in which 
writing both produces a material instantiation of ideology and also assumes a space on 
which it will write itself again. Put simply, the history (of scripturality) manifests an 
ontology of power.  
 The subject that emerges within a scriptural economy, if we’re to follow de 
Carteau’s argument, is a subject that necessarily needs to write in order to be and to 
become in the dominant scriptural sphere. And within this sphere of “applicability” – 
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meaning the sphere in which scripturality acts as a specific kind of literacy – the subject’s 
relationship not only with truth but also with language is shaped by the demand to 
produce. De Certeau explains how the system of language is disrupted when the “first 
speaker” (whether God or a god-like figure in many origin stories of language) is 
removed. All that is left is a hole in which the subject must always be moving or 
producing: both speaking and writing so as not to lose a sense of agency and identity in 
the void of a disseminated language that has no touchstone. In lieu of a language that is 
emergent and continuous with the more-than-human-world, language, understood as 
being-scriptural, becomes a mode of production and an object which implies, according 
to de Certeau, “a distancing of the living body (both traditional and individual) and thus 
also of everything which remains, among the people, linked to the earth, to the place, to 
orality or to non-verbal tasks.”56  
 Being-scriptural means being a part of a specific strain of literacy that contributes 
to the sphere of contemporary power. One that takes control of languages, writes history, 
and informs the way in which socioeconomic gradations are organized and the relative 
mobility that those living in certain gradation can engage in. Fundamentally, writing 
writes the body into a new way of being: one that is removed from the more-than-human-
world and is almost completely ensconced within the “written-sphere.” 
 Fundamentally, the type of literacy being critiqued comes down to three factors 
that work together: 1) a model or a “text,” 2) the instruments used for writing or 
inscribing the model, and 3) the material on which the text emerges: i.e. the material that 
instantiates the body, the book, or anything in the world that bears script. As de Certeau 
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writes, “using tools to make a body conform to its definition in a social discourse: that is 
the movement.”57  
 I am not arguing against the fact that the body is symbolically constructed and 
symbolically innervated. In fact, I’m in complete agreement with that premise, since it’s 
only because of the many other symbolisms and literacies all participating with one 
another aesthetically that the specific kind of literacy being critiqued is able to exist and 
continue. What I am concerned with, however, is the equivalence of the tools that 
multiply and indefinitely fragment so as to adapt to the many different ways an individual 
human being can experience reality (or a specific kind of literacy) on the one hand, and 
the symbolic nature of reality that eclipses the human realm of epistemology on the other. 
They are not the same thing, and cannot be allowed to be defined as such. The body is 
“postulated as the signifier (the term) in a contract”58 but that contract, well before the 
“scriptural, human-tool constructed contract” even comes into being, is an agreement – a 
response-ability – with the affective nature of reality writ large. This kind of response-
ability that always presupposes the designation of “tool-ness” to a “tool” can be felt in 
what de Certeau calls the interaction between the “tools” and the “flesh” – the flesh being 
the sensing or affective body itself. He writes that this interaction creates “on the one 
hand… a change in the fiction (a correction of knowledge) and, on the other, the cry, 
which shrieks an in-articulable pain and constitutes the un-thought part of bodily 
difference.”59 And this cry is the way in which we’re always already a-scriptural 
underneath and all around our being scriptural, situated within a scriptural economy.  
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 I’d argue that being-scriptural needs to inflate its definition of what a “tool” is to 
the very images – what de Certeau calls the empty centers – themselves that the tools try 
and capture and concretize into what can be assimilated into knowledge or the 
“symbolic” – again, as if the symbolic is only a construct of the human mind, or 
sequestered to human experience. And de Certeau comes very close to doing this when 
he describes tools as marking the gap between the fictions and simulacra (or symbols) on 
one side and the continuum of “natural forces, of libidinal drives and instinctual 
outpourings,”60 on the other. He then describes how this “boundary” is beginning to 
break down with the advent of “second-wave of literacy” that strain of literacy connected 
to technology and the internet. That is to say that the instruments or the tools are slowly 
becoming, in de Certeau’s world, obsolescent: anachronistic in the move towards a faster, 
more electronic world.61  
But in my own argument, the “tools” themselves are continuous with both sides of 
the bifurcation of “knowledge” and “natural forces.” The tools emerge from the “natural 
forces” since the natural forces themselves are the catalysts behind the human 
recognizing something as a tool, and having the desire to capture some sort of affect 
inspired by the natural, libidinal forces always washing in from the more-than-human-
world. This kind of interaction, then, would be like the concrescence of a wave washing 
onto the beach: as the natural forces wash in as a wave, they come into contact with the 
material actuality of the sand, creating bubbles of foam that act as the transient 
knowledge of the human on the beach. The “tools” then, which we’re able to use in order 
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to interact with the more-than-human world, are primordial, just as the symbolic is: the 
beach has always been there, with an infinite number of grains that can or already do 
contribute to the bubbling up of new spheres of thinking – new spheres of applicability, 
new kinds of literacies. The problem, as I see it, is defining the apparatuses that are 
constructed on the beach of experience as the “tools” themselves, bypassing the very real 
and sensuous and always affecting “tools” that are the infinite grains on the beach – i.e. 
the many different organisms that make up our reality, that are things in themselves, and 
that contribute to our experience.62 All of this is also to say that certain “tools” will be 
caught up within the vortex of a moving literacy, and be appropriated so as to be only 
strictly a tool within that literacy, effectively reifying the validity of that literacy as a 
symbolic structure that can sustain itself – at least for a time – along the z-axis as it 
moves through time and space, and new organisms come into and out of its 
“atmosphere.”  
As de Certeau questions, “where and when is there ever anything bodily that is 
not written, remade, cultured, identified by the different tools which are part of a social, 
symbolic code?”63 Answer: what is bodily is just as much at the limits of the “human-
made” tools, as it is within the tools themselves. While there are the tools that contribute 
to a societal symbolic-structure that write on the body and force the body to conform 
within the lines of what can be said and what can’t, at the limits there is the scream, the 
pure affect that is also always bodily and contributing to the body – affecting it, and 
pushing it along, like a pulse. This, too, is the symbolic and contributes to the creation of 
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and utilization of “tools.” There are codes, yes, that emerge through reiteration of a 
certain system that seems to work, but forgetting that the code and the systemized, 
conventional way of utilizing tools were, themselves, birthed by a wave of affect which 
came from the more-than-human-world and other literacies is a mistake that writing and 
being-scriptural needs to learn from. To return to our diagrammatic understanding of 
literacy, the many infinite organisms that move on the y-axis, and that make up the x-
axis, are always feeling and being influenced by the other organisms and their literacies 
via aesthetic prehensions that make up each kind of literacy. As things are now, there is a 
strong desire – a valid desire – to be recognized within a dominant societal “code” that 
grants power-positions – or at the very least, positions from which one can survive as a 
body – to those who fit the definition of a tool-user, or a reader of the pseudo-symbolic 
that is laid over the more-than-human-world of the symbolic. In this case, that pseudo-
symbolic drapery is the scriptural literacy we’re following. But that which opposes this 
passion for conformity and identity – and that which pushes the zeitgeist further on its 
roll – is the affect, and this affect needs to be re-recognized by the scriptural economy as 
part of the symbolic and as laying the groundwork for the scriptural: a groundwork that is 
fundamentally a-scriptural, and that is also infusing a validity and a valuable-essence to 
all that exists: from the very small (e.g. a pebble) to the very complex (e.g. an a-literate 
being). Until then, the mode of being-scriptural will be stuck on the side of a negative 
feedback loop that contributes only to the reification of inorganic systems of control: not 
saturated in the very passionate, affective stream of life that allows one to feel the foam 
of the world as it washes over their bodies, flowing in such a way so as to always be 
creating something new and beautiful. Being-scriptural must incorporate the scream, the 
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laugh, the ascriptural experience, the affect, so as to see (and feel) the porousness of the 
type of literacy it depends upon (scripturality), and write towards and with those kairotic 
moments of feeling, dazzling at the sparks of new-reality that are created during the 
friction of a moment, an emotion, and a movement.  
 
Modes of Being: Being-Ascriptural 
 
 Towards the end of his chapter on the scriptural economy, de Certeau writes that 
“the time is thus over in which the ‘real’ appeared to come into the text to be 
manufactured and exported … the text mimes its own death and makes it ridiculous … it 
is no more than the illusory sacrament of the real, a space of laughter at the expense of 
yesterday’s axioms.”64 In other words, because of the recursive nature of the symbolic 
that is believed to be strictly situated within the human realm of experience, the words 
play off of each other, refracting and reflecting until all that is left is irony and cynicism: 
a space in which honesty and sublimity are scoffed at and treated as a joke, or as satirical; 
where one has to feel like they’re “in on it” instead of allowing themselves to be opened 
up to and overwhelmed by a truth that isn’t already appropriated by the economy of the 
scriptural – awash in a moment of lucidity that overflows description.  
 Foucault acknowledges this same recursivity of language when he writes that: 
 
“somewhat before the invention of writing, a change had to occur to open the 
space in which writing could flow and establish itself, a change … that forms one 
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of the most decisive ontological events of language: its mirrored reflection upon 
death and the construction, from this reflection, of a virtual space where speech 
discovers the endless resourcefulness of its own image, and where it can represent 
itself as already existing behind itself, already active beyond itself, to infinity.”65 
 
This kind of virtual space that is opened up by language so as to allow writing in is what 
Foucault will call death: the “limit and the center” in and through which the human – and 
all things – always murmurs, repeats, restates, and continues on, never ending. The 
problem, however, that one encounters in this virtual space that is opened with writing is 
that language becomes, as Foucault states, “lodged and hidden” within this ever-repeating 
stream of mirrors, with “a work of language only [advancing] more deeply into the 
intangible density of the mirror, [calling] forth the double of this already-doubled 
writing.”66 This kind of burrowing into the mirror of what, fundamentally, is the symbolic 
of a speech – which has its own ideograms and phonetic elements – creates universes of 
new opportunity for sociality and communication, while creating a web so dense that it’s 
difficult to get through the membrane of language to any sort of “outside” from which 
language can replenish itself. This is the question: how is it that language and rhetoric are 
never exhausted amidst the towering creations of the human imagination and intellect, all 
of which need – demand, even – a certain kind of energy to keep them running?  
 The answer, I think, can be found in the way in which being-ascriptural allows for 
a certain open-ness, a certain exposure and feeling of attunement towards the outside 
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without the necessity of an interiority to uphold its membrane. Of course, this kind of 
feeling is always already concomitant with being-scriptural. That is to say that the way in 
which what goes “unheard” in community (a community of the scriptural, mind you) is 
exactly that stream of affective sensitivity that a body can’t ever be rid of, and is that 
which allows for language to always have more “energy,” more “affect” and “feeling” to 
reproduce and contend with. In other words, a-scripturality is what reinforces 
scripturality without scripturality formally recognizing a-scripturality as a contributing 
factor. Abram writes that “in learning how to read we must break the spontaneous 
participating of our eyes and our ears in the surrounding terrain (where they had 
converged in the synesthetic encounter with animals, plants, and streams) in order to 
recouple those senses upon the flat surface of the page,”67 but even in the learning of how 
to successfully make the “break,” our bodies don’t fully disengage with the more-than-
human-world that’s always already existing and allowing us a place to be and to dwell. 
There are many other literacies, then, always already contributing to the one in which we 
find ourselves. And these other literacies and organisms provide both a foundation on 
which to work outward, and an energy source from which the aesthetic circulates, like a 
current, allowing there to be movement and innovation within the specific vein of literacy 
(being-scriptural) that we’ve been critiquing.  
 This kind of relation with the Other – both the other as another human and the 
more-than-human-world – creates a relation with, as Blanchot writes, the Autrui (or the 
others) which “exceeds me absolutely”68 and cannot be captured within the realm of 
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representation at all, but that must contribute to the Foucaldian murmuring: the haunting 
that allows for there to always be a movement. This kind of relationship with the outside, 
with the Autrui, is a presencing that is always immediate, always now; it exceeds “all 
direct relation, all mystical fusion, and all sensible contact… a relation escaping 
power.”69 This escaping from power should remind us of the power that seems to flow 
through the assemblage of being-scriptural. In other words, it’s exactly this immediate 
Other-ing that is always already there, providing space, place, and feeling to a body that 
can only ever regurgitate it out – even if such a regurgitation occurs through a system of 
literacy. It’s not the system of literacy that allows for newness, it’s the encounter with the 
other that creates an “eruption of exteriority that pierces the smooth ordering both of my 
‘world’ and of my sense of interiority, making an entry while resisting my power 
absolutely.”70 This kind of othering can never be captured and always contributes to the 
newness of concepts that are captured and appropriated into the lexicon of the colloquial 
language. In not so many words, this Other-ing – the Autrui – is the more-than-human-
world as it is felt: influencing and affecting us by creating moments of rapture within the 
scriptural economy, overflowing what this literacy can afford from within its own 
practices. I’d argue that being-scriptural is always built atop of what it means to be a-
scriptural. The two are connected aesthetically through vibrations up and down so as to 
create ripples that are immanent to both ways of being. In fact, it is these affective 
currents that allow for there to be communication in between different modes of being: 
even though one plateau – being-scriptural – is working through a system as invisible as 
the one that the other plateau – being-ascriptural – is working with (that is, both are being 
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influenced by the aesthetic). One imagines the scriptural-body moving through the 
landscape, naming and thinking, while the ascriptural-body moves, feels, and reacts in a 
much more sensuous, conscious way – that is to say, conscious of the affect, and not 
leveraging the consciousness so as to name things.  
 My contention is that this pre-originary feeling that defines ascriptural ways of 
being are still available and active in the scriptural way of being – hence the two being 
folded together. I’d argue that this kind of feeling is what seems to allow for the very 
creation of any sort of scriptural economy – and community – in the first place: a 
necessary affective attunement that allows for a feeling of solidarity with the “Other” 
who both creates an identity for the singular individual, and who71 allows for there to be 
vibrations of either verbal or bodily communication through these connections of affect. 
This kind of sense of community is for Diane Davis centered around “the death of its 
members” – “of those whom we call, perhaps, wrongly it’s members – that is, around, 
‘the loss (the impossibility) of their immanence.”72 That is to say that, if we’re to cite 
Charles Bukowski: we’re all going to die, all of us, what a circus! That alone should 
make us love each other…”73 And even if it doesn’t necessarily make us all love each 
other, that kind of inevitability of death, that inalterable finitude, is what opens an 
individual – in this case, “me” – to a sort of primordial rapture in which I realize both that 
my birth and my death are – (and were) –  inevitable bookends to the life I will live, and 
to the lives that all things will “live,” regardless of sentience. This kind of realization – 
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but even more than a realization, this kind of affect and feeling – is the “presenting … 
[of] my existence outside myself [ to myself] – my ekstatis, my exposedness.”74 This kind 
of primordially affective sense of community – which both creates a sense of self, and 
then pushes the “self” outside of “itself” – creates the sense of responsiveness and 
response-ability that calls for you to be aware of your exposure to the outside that creates 
an inside, and that demands a reinterpretation of what it means when we say someone is 
literate versus someone who is illiterate.  
 What I think has happened, however, is that this feeling of exposedness has been 
swallowed up by the language that is also “out there,” rather than the Other being that 
created an affect. In other words, instead of feeling the community of inevitable dying, 
feeling corpses and organisms that all share a sense of finitude, one loses themselves in 
the web of rational thought: a reminder of the culture that makes necessary a need to 
produce and create and consume. This kind of leaning into the written language, and 
being – or becoming – dependent upon the scriptural and literate economy creates an 
environment in which truth becomes taken as literal truth and emotion; solidarity, and 
love most be literally conceived and seen. As Abram writes, “literal truth is entirely an 
artifact of alphabetic literacy: to be literally true originally mean to be true to the “letter 
of scripture” – to “the letter of the law.”75 A move, then, necessarily needs to be taken 
that allows for a more faithful, more ecological approach to the more-than-human-world 
and to the other-bodies and organisms that surround, envelop, create, and protect us: 
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indeed, affecting us always, and allowing for there to be a solid foundation on which a 
literate intellect may be built and emerge.  
 The question that arises is how to capture a sense of connectedness, of 
embeddedness while still leveraging the usefulness of scriptural literacy yet avoiding 
reverting to a scriptural economy that writes over the historical emergence of literacy 
from the more-than-human-world at the expense of acknowledging an ontological 
affectivity. For Abram, this capturing happens through “story-telling,” at least in the oral 
culture, but I am not talking about oral culture so much as being-ascriptural within a 
culture of the script. The main point behind Abram’s utilization of stories, however, can 
still be saved for my point. He writes that stories are not judged on how well they adhere 
to a “literal” kind of reality, but rather they are “judged according to whether [they] make 
sense. [Which is to say] to enliven the senses.”76 Abram continues by writing that “to 
make sense is to release the body from the constraints imposed by outworn ways of 
speaking, and hence to renew and rejuvenate one’s felt awareness of the world.”77 This 
kind of attunement to the senses and to the more than human world was one that was 
diffuse in oral cultures78 and that carries over into ascriptural being: mainly in the feeling 
of the tension between being ascriptural (illiterate within a scriptural economy) and being 
literate (that is, literate in scripturality). In other words, those who are illiterate do 
desperately want to be literate, and they understand the importance of being able to 
communicate in such a way, but there’s also a sense of losing a certain kind of 
attunement, a certain kind of being, that allows one to perhaps more deeply, more 
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emotionally connect to and react to the more-than-human-world. The important lesson to 
learn, then, from those who are, or who have been, functionally illiterate and ascriptural 
and who have lived and worked/moved within a scriptural economy is how they felt 
while being illiterate and what kinds of feelings they were able to bring into their new 
way of being: i.e. being-scriptural. These kinds of experiences – these kinds of stories – 
create currents of recursivity within the stream of human-language-literacy that run 
counter to the dominant current of scripturality, being influenced by alternate literacies 
and affects that expose the porousness of each strain of literacy, and how these pores can 
be moved within and through.   
 In order to enliven the senses while situated within a scriptural economy it’s 
important to expose the fault-lines of the dominant literacy narrative – that of cultural 
capital and currency – and explore the ways in which there are undercurrents of different 
narratives that present themselves as also contributing, even in a small part, to the way in 
which literacy is understood and lived – especially from the vantage point of those who 
were functionally illiterate and ascriptural. As Richardson argues, “literacy acquisition is 
not a set of skills to be mastered. It is looking inward into one’s own thought and 
cultural/language patterns and history, while looking outward into the world’s, seeking to 
intervene in one’s own context.”79  
 Richardson’s description of literacy, here, seems to be much more attuned to the 
lived experience rather than literacy’s connection to any sort of socio-economic mobility 
that seems to dominate de Certeau’s description of living within a scriptural economy. 
This definition of literacy suits the experiences narrated by four adults – Violeta, Chief, 
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George, and Lee Ann – who all “came into literacy” after living a large portion of their 
adult lives as illiterate. Laura Rosenberg follows their ascriptural lives situated and 
working within the scriptural economy in her dissertation, Rewriting Ideologies of 
Literacy: A Study of Writing by Newly Literate Adults. Their experiences open up the 
dominant literacy narrative by exposing the dynamic forces of ideology, power, 
experience, and affect at work underneath the ostensible structure of an economy. Their 
narratives showcase the porousness endemic to being-scriptural as it relates to other 
literacies and affects.  
 The kinds of experiences that the four people in Rosenberg’s study recall as 
illiterates can be called, as Freire explains, “limit-situations” which are situations that are 
“directed at negating and overcoming, rather than passively accepting, the ‘given’”80 
which in this case is the literate-way-of-being. Freire goes on to write that even though 
there are lived experiences on the “other side” of dominant ideologies and narratives, 
those who are living them, “once they come to perceive these situations as the frontier 
between being and being more human, rather than the frontier between being and 
nothingness, they begin to direct their increasingly critical actions towards achieving the 
untested feasibility implicit in that perception.”81 In other words, the illiterate-way-of-
being can be considered as a subaltern position within or beside the strain of scriptural 
literacy that currently is the most dominant. The stories of Rosenberg’s participants allow 
for there to be a construction of a counter-hegemony, or a counter-strain of literacy – an 
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alternative narrative that pushes at and past the boundaries of what’s considered 
conventional within the hegemonic assemblage of scripturality itself.   
 A particularly interesting finding of Rosenberg research was that “contrary to 
critical pedagogues’ belief that a critical perspective must be taught, the newly literate 
members of my study already have a perspective from which they critique culture, 
especially their own subject position as non-literates. They do not need to be told how to 
interrogate their experiences.”82 As an educated person myself, I can attest to the 
experience of being told the narrative that school is necessary in order to “think 
critically” and engage with society and the world in a thoughtful way. Through 
interviews, Rosenberg is able to isolate four “alternative literacy narratives” that her case 
study members articulate: 1.) “Illiteracy” as a Social Violence – a narrative of 
recognition; 2.) complicating the literacy myth – a narrative of critique; 3.) pleasure 
versus self-improvement – a narrative of excess; and 4.) critical citizenry “without” 
literacy – a narrative of resistance. These four counter-narratives are organized so as to 
depict experiences by Rosenberg’s study participants that directly subvert four particular 
narrative-pillars within the strain of literacy I’m calling scripturality. What these 
narratives do is tell a story that opens up scripturality to show its interconnectedness – 
how there is actually something instead of nothing on the other side of each strain of 
literacy, and these many somethings all contribute to the specific current of literacy we 
find ourselves in at each moment.   
 In the first alternative literacy narrative, Rosenberg recalls George and Lee Ann’s 
experience as (ascriptural) illiterates in which they were able to recognize and name an 
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oppressive situation that leveraged literacy as a violent power. Rosenberg begins this 
section by writing that “according to Freirean principles, the first step towards praxis is 
the ability to name oppressive situations. Identifying power and recognizing that it is used 
to maintain unequal relationships is the beginning of critical self-awareness.”83 For both 
George and Lee Ann, this kind of recognition happened even though they were both 
illiterate. Here’s an excerpt of a conversation George had with Laura Rosenberg:  
 
George: You got an education; you can fend for yourself. You know, you 
know, I mean, a person don’t. You can’t really write, you don’t know 
whether it’s right or wrong; you know what I mean?  
George: But, if you, um, got, you know, you can figure it out for yourself, you 
know, you’ve got to learn, you know, you know, get an education.  
Lauren: So, it sounds like, it sounds like you’re thinking that it sort of give 
you a way to be in the world, like, a way of approaching situations and 
dealing with the world.  
George: Yep. If you, if you go to court right now, if you go and I go to court 
right now. Let’s say we have to stand up in front of the judge and, and plead 
our case. Quite naturally you are going to plea your case twice time better 
than I plead mine. Thing is I might want to say, and I might, you know; but I 
don’t know how to put it in the proper word -- So, the judge ain’t going to 
listen.  
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For Lee Ann, her experience was when she was illiterate, but wanted to sing in the church 
choir. What happened, however, was that after joining the choir, the director eventually 
found out that she was illiterate and embarrassed her in front of the rest of the choir. She 
says that:  
 
He tested my voice, and he, so he said, he put me on the man’s side. All the 
women was over here, and all the men was over here [she gestures]. Okay? 
He put me over there. So what happened is, so, I think he wanted to 
discourage me going, and didn’t want me involved in, in, in the program. 
 
 In both instances, George and Lee Ann are calling attention to how power 
structures are influencing the way in which they, as bodies situated within an ideological 
framework, are treated. This kind of recognition establishes a counter-narrative to the 
dominant narrative that “illiterates” are oppressed and unable to critique the “way things 
are.” To the contrary, both George and Lee Ann feel very strongly the way in which 
power operates, and both are able to critically understand their position, even though they 
are – or were – illiterate (ascriptural). In both experiences, George and Lee Ann are able 
to put words to the scream that de Certeau names in his work – that which exceeds the 
“knowledge” that is supposed to be instilled by the dominant literacy. In fact, what 
George and Lee Ann expose is that the scream and the knowledge aren’t mutually 
exclusive (de Certeau describes them as being dichotomous; one on this hand, and the 
other on that hand): both are always entwined and there are ways in which certain 
kairotic moments of experience and affect provide ways to experience the kind of 
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mutuality of literacy and illiteracy an organism finds itself in. Each strain of literacy is 
mutually affective with illiteracy always – resonating with aesthetic vibrations that are 
not contained within historic, evolved forms of being scriptural or ascriptural (the z-axis).  
 The second alternative literacy narrative that Rosenberg presents – a narrative of 
critique – explores the way in which George acts as a “border-crosser” between literacy 
and illiteracy, demonstrating how ideologies, “inequalities, power and human suffering 
are rooted in basic institutional structures.” When people are able to move in between and 
around these structures, they are “moving in and out of borders constructed around 
coordinates of difference and power,”84 in this case, the coordinates of difference and 
power as related to literacy-as-scripturality and illiteracy-as-ascripturality and beyond. 
For George, this kind of crossing inspires the following narrative:  
 
Lauren: So, when you say here, you say “Education for everybody help to make a 
better world.” 
Geroge: It does.  
Lauren: Is that, is that sort of what you’re thinking?  
George: Yup. You know, if everybody in the world have an education, there’d be 
less crime. There’d be less people on welfare. There’d be less people in, in the 
shelter.  
Lauren: Mmm hmm. 
George: And this country would feel better.  
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George goes on to describe that the country would “feel” better because those who are 
educated are more likely to think twice before making mistakes (and I don’t disagree with 
him) but I think his initial statement that the country would “feel” better is particularly 
fascinating and informative. His comments here show how George has been and 
currently is distinctly attuned to the way in which communication and judgement (which 
is itself a form of communication) feels for the individual. I’m thinking here of the way 
in which Davis describes the pre-originary rhetoricity of affect that permeates all 
interaction. For George, he’s able to critique the material conditions of the scriptural 
economy and society he finds himself in from two points of view: that of the illiterate (as 
ascriptural) and that of the newly literate (within a scriptural-economy). In both cases, he 
exposes the aesthetic connection that binds the two together: the feeling that underlies 
interaction and movement, and which inevitably influences the way in which material 
reality becomes organized. And in “crossing the border” between ascripturality and 
scripturality, he doesn’t lose the aesthetic attunement that was available to him as an 
ascriptural. Rather, by entering “into” and still “feeling” scripturality, George is able to 
understand and state that the more people are able to become literate, the better the world 
would be for it. I think the important aspect of this recognition is that George himself is 
coming into being scripturally-literate, rather than having been raised within it and its 
ethos. This seems to mean that George doesn’t take literacy for granted and as a natural 
aspect of the human experience. There’s an important distancing from the scriptural-
economy that allows George the space to feel scripturality as a construct – an assemblage 
– and a community, while also calling attention to the importance of the feeling itself: 
that which gives rise to his recognition of the structure of scripturality. And the fact that 
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George can still “fit-into” the scriptural economy even after having “come into it” later in 
life, means that George’s recognition of the feeling of scripturality is always already there 
within being-scriptural. In other words, scripturality and ascripturality are folded into 
each other and connected through aesthetic vibrations that influence individual 
organisms’ experiences.  
 The third alternative literacy narrative is that of pleasure versus self-improvement. 
Rosenberg details the experience Chief has of scriptural literacy. She writes:  
 
Lauren: When you say now, “It opened up a whole new world for me,” is that like 
the world that’s past that place that you couldn’t get past?  
Chief: Yes, because I like that, I been reading about ancient history and all that. 
And it’s stuff that I like to know about. I didn’t know all these things. And I read 
about books about, ah, ancient history all back in, uh, Christopher Columbus and 
all that, ah; that’s what’s big, the great stones over in England there?  
Lauren: Stonehenge?  
Chief: Stonehenge. And I read that book and I get --- I love, I love to read about the 
ancient history.  
 
In this detailed experience, Rosenberg writes that Chief is expressing a narrative of 
pleasure that exceeds the confines of the dominant narratives of a scriptural economy, i.e. 
the accrual of cultural and economic capital. In this kind of experience, Chief is revealing 
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“that pleasure has a purpose outside of any kind of gain. Through his pleasure in reading 
and writing, Chief points to a desire to rework the world according to his own terms.”85  
 This kind of retelling of an experience of literacy-as-scripturality exposes how 
Chief is able to experience a real, pleasurable affect from “entering” into different worlds 
or “ways of being” that the medium of literacy-as-scripturality and the written word is 
able to crystallize and communicate effectively. For Chief, there’s no sense of 
domination, but rather an opening up – a willing vulnerability – from which he returns 
with a renewed sense of happiness, contentment and connection. This kind of experience 
of literacy also, as Rosenberg points out, allows Chief a way in which to overflow and 
exceed the dominant narrative of scripturality as a currency and a socio-economic 
mobility race. For Chief, he’s able to exceed the borders of that narrative, leave them 
behind and instead show how a different sphere of applicability can be entered into that is 
outside of the dominant narrative of scripturality. Chief feels a strong sense of solidarity 
with parts of the world and with other people and organisms that he hadn’t had the 
opportunity to experience when he lived an ascriptural life. Of course, because George is 
a border-crosser between ascripturality and scripturality, the experience of these different 
spheres of applicability opened up by literacy is that he’s able to feel the affect of 
entering into these other ways of being and experiencing. Instead of allowing these kinds 
of educational, literate experiences to be neatly organized within a demarcated “reading 
to learn” box of understanding, Chief allows himself to lose himself within the emotions 
and movements of each book and world that is opened up.  
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In my reading, such an experience seems to resonate with the experiences of an 
oral culture and their relationship with the more-than-human-world. That is to say, Chief 
seems to experience the book in the same aesthetic way that an orally based person 
experiences the world: where he’s able to leverage the technological, material aspects of 
being-scriptural – reading a book or a text – so as to peer into other kinds of realities as 
explained within the strain of scripturality, like many different honey-combs of 
scriptural-experience, with certain rhetorical moves made so as to construct the image in 
a certain way. Of course, we all do this, and all text is written rhetorically, but what 
makes Chief’s story significant is that he focuses on the affective nature of the text and 
by extension the affective nature of the place or topic being discussed in the text, which 
highlights the way in which literacies writ large make us feel and move. That’s the point 
that Chief drives home: literacy makes us feel and that feeling is a requisite component of 
every type of literacy – especially scripturality.  
 Finally, in the fourth alternative literacy narrative, Rosenberg speaks with Violeta, 
who expresses a counter narrative that exposes a critical citizenry without her being 
dependent upon literacy or being literate so as to have a type of “scriptural-citizenship.” 
The following is a piece written by Violeta:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
		 61	
My Conversation with Rosa Parks 
Violeta Blanca 
February 18, 2004 
 
 One day I had a dream that I was sitting next to Rosa Parks on bus. I said, I 
am proud of you because you never gave up. You are a strong woman. You helped 
the black people to not be segregated. You decided to bring the people together to 
make a protest. You helped get justice to the black people. The white people were 
prejudiced to the black people. Thank you for your story because we learned about 
your good work. 
 
Lauren Rosenberg then goes on to talk to Violeta about this piece:  
 
Lauren: And I was wondering was it, was it really? Did you really dream that? Or 
did you … was it like fiction? Were you making it up, like a story?  
Violeta: Uh huh, making it up, fiction. At the time, well, we picked out that one, and 
I was getting in my head, you know, like, um, like a movie. You know, and I start to 
write it.  
Violeta: I’m magic, you know. I see how she see, how that happen. And sometimes 
we talking about story, we get it in our head, and I think of she was like that. I knew 
how she was. I think she was like that. That’s the kind of imagination that you have 
in your head.  
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Lauren: In that, um, well, a number of things struck me in this. You say, “I am 
proud of you because you never gave up.” Now, maybe I’m just connecting these 
because they’re one after the other --- but, do you think Rosa Parks is like a single 
mother? In the way she’s strong? 
Violeta: Uh, I think the way she’s strong is because it was bad thing that happen in 
her life. And she never gave up. You know, she keeping going. And I think she just 
the kind of person, when she wants something, she going the right way: “that’s what 
I want, I want to learn.” She never gave up, she front of everybody that was 
accusing her, she ego, “This is what I want, this is the kind of person that I am. And 
right here, I want to do this, and I want to do it.” 
 
Violeta creates an image of Rosa Parks: as a strong woman who cannot be 
overcome by the forces acting on her. By extension, Violeta herself draws inspiration 
from this image, and emulates this kind of radical resistance which recasts Violeta not as 
a paralyzed, ignorant agent type-cast by a dominant view of illiteracy, but rather as a 
strong, capable woman, positioning herself as a resister, harnessing her feelings of 
individuality and desire. This kind of re-positioning shows that, as Laura Rosenberg 
writes, “Violeta is recreating herself as a figure that confronts the limit-situations of 
poverty, single-motherhood, and non-literacy.”86  
 This kind of re-positioning for Violeta exposes two important observations. First, 
the kind of desire Violeta shows to situate herself as a resister against the oppressive 
material conditions of her life and her environment exposes an attunement and 
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recognition of those material conditions. Her resistance demands that she uphold a certain 
awareness of her subject position as an ascriptural woman situated within a scriptural 
economy. This upholding, this endurance, demands that she learn from and feel how 
oppressive conditions move through and shape her subject-position. This is to say that 
Violeta must have felt and been able to critique her material and ideological conditions 
while being ascriptural. She was literate in the ontology of power without the benefit of 
scriptural prowess. And obviously, as she becomes more literate and more scriptural, 
she’s able to express how she felt and what she thought during that time in her life, in 
addition to being able to describe what she is currently thinking about her situation.  
 The second observation is that Violeta’s critique of her material conditions resists 
“a dominant narrative of civic participation that insists literacy gives people the right kind 
of voice to participate in public conversations.”87 Of course, Violeta is benefiting from 
her literacy training, but as Rosenberg notes, her “critical perspective does not depend on 
this dominant narrative.”88 Rather, as a border-crosser like the three other people in 
Rosenberg’s case study, she was and is able to experience her environment in a way that 
resonates with an aesthetic attunement to her material and ideological conditions. 
Violeta’s lived-experience demonstrates the fourth alternative-literacy narrative that can 
be argued for in Rosenberg’s work: that being a critically engaged, active citizen does not 
demand an adherence to the dominant mode and narrative of literacy. Rather, one can feel 
themselves into critical positions of resistance, situated as they are within a scriptural 
economy. From this position of resistance, if they do become scriptural like Violeta does 
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they can then have a different, more affective relationship with writing and scriptural 
literacy, one that they can leverage for continued work as a critical citizen.  
 And indeed, this is exactly what Violeta and every other participant in this study 
does. They do engage in the scriptural-economy, and feel themselves as being in a state 
of becoming, as they react and write back to power which establishes them within fluid 
positions of identity. And this kind of fluidity, when it comes to subjectivity, has 
implications for the way in which the scriptural-economy itself continues to evolve and 
exist. As Barbara Biesecker argues, the idea of a shifting subject also destabilizes the idea 
of an audience, meaning that as each of these subjects learn to write and enter into the 
world of scripturality they influence the ways in which audiences are created within the 
scriptural economy. Effectively aspects of the scriptural economy itself shift to better feel 
those subjects who are border crossers themselves. As Biesecker writes, “it becomes 
possible to read discursive practices neither as rhetorics directed to preconsituted and 
known audiences nor as rhetorics ‘in search of’ objectively identifiable but yet 
undiscovered audiences.”89 In learning how to write and become-scriptural, Violeta and 
Chief and George and Lee-Ann are creating audiences that react to the subjects created in 
their writing, effectively engaging in the work of creating aesthetic opportunities for 
emancipation and solidarity aided by non-scriptural forms of symbolism.  
 
Beginning to Undo: The Need to Unfold Outwards 
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 In the last two sections, we’ve traced the ways in which being-scriptural and 
being-ascriptural influence on one hand the dominant ecological and economic 
environment that both ways of being find themselves in, and on the other hand, how the 
individual being is influenced by this environment, dependent upon their lived experience 
of being-scriptural or being-ascriptural. Both ways of being are inevitably influenced by 
the more-than-human-world, regardless of the ideological and socio-economic 
circumstances. What’s particularly important for my study is that those who are, or who 
have been functionally illiterate and have lived an ascriptural life, “already have the 
critical perspectives that theorists believe they must be taught.”90 Their retelling of 
alternative narratives showcase their ability to give a voice to their story – very much in 
line with how Abram articulates the need for stories to make sense and resonate with us 
and our feelings, even after one becomes literate and scriptural.  
 Having explored these four stories and four alternative narratives that present 
themselves against the dominant narrative of illiteracy as the “dark other,” Rosenberg 
instead shows that her case study participants articulate desires and purposes for seeking 
literacy that surround their lived experience that they express through the telling of 
alternative literacy narratives.”91 These acts of resistance and critique showcase the 
underlying connection between both modes of being: that of an aesthetic attunement to, 
and connection with, language and the more-than-human-world that allows scriptural 
being to emerge. 
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 The aesthetic connection between being-scriptural and being-ascriptural demands, 
then, that we dismantle the dichotomy of literacy and illiteracy so as to better explore the 
interconnectedness. We must ask what perceptions, imaginings, feelings, and cognitions 
are sacrificed when we learn to read and write? And, perhaps more importantly, are they 
really ever lost? The answer I’ve tried to argue for is no, but it’s these questions that 
motivate a desire to overflow the boundaries of literacy and illiteracy as defined within a 
dominant assemblage of knowledge and power. Understanding that literacies are like 
strains or strings of experience suggests that one may find what answers one can outside 
of the boundedness of dominant narratives by listening to marginalized voices write and 
speak back to power. There is more to illiteracy and literacy than we’re taught and like 
the four individuals in Rosenberg’s case studies – Violeta, George, Chief, and Lee Ann – 
we will have to re-orient ourselves so as to feel this excess to literacy such that it may 
influence our speaking about – and teaching – literacy and illiteracy.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RE-ORIENTATION: EXPLORING A SYMBOLIC OF AFFECT 
 
 
The kind of re-orientation that must take place for us to submit a new narrative of 
our own about the relationship between literacy and illiteracy must necessarily engage 
with the current conceptual organization of these terms. That kind of relationship, as 
we’ve traced in the last chapter by following the two different modes of being – scriptural 
and ascriptural – is dichotomously arranged within the dominant discourse that has 
emerged with literacy. As we’ve also noted, there’s a valid argument for stating that this 
arrangement is false, and that it leaves large parts of experience, literate and illiterate, out 
of the conversation – a silence that highlights the ramifications of how this kind of 
discourse influences our being-in-the-world. As I noted in the last chapter, literacy is 
generally thought of as a skill-set: an ability to read and write in the dominant language 
of one’s socio-historical milieu, while illiteracy is generally thought of as a lack. In order 
to continue dismantling this dichotomy, in this chapter I’m especially interested in 
exploring the implications of situating literacy and illiteracy on the horizontal axis I 
introduced in the last chapter, and connecting these implications to the field of rhetorical 
theory. In particular, I’m interested in shifting the definition of literacy and illiteracy into 
an aesthetic register and exploring the consequences of this re-orientation. My hope is to 
remove literacy and illiteracy from being considered as only epistemological skills and to 
consider literacy and illiteracy as different degrees of aesthetic perception, with the 
presupposition that all organisms are ontologically equal – that is, that there’s no 
ontological difference between those objects and subjects who are considered “literate” 
and those who are considered “illiterate.” This way, rather than determining the 
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pragmatic value of literacy and illiteracy, we may determine the creative value of both 
ways of being, in addition to exploring how these ways of being influence each other 
explicitly and implicitly. Such a move also demands a new way of relating to language as 
such. Specifically, I submit both literacy and illiteracy as both equally symbolics of 
affect, permeable, immanent, and rhetorical. With this, then, I turn to more deeply 
explore the different way of thinking about literacy that I introduced in chapter two. This 
diagrammatic reconceptualization of literacy and illiteracy clears the way to begin talking 
about the illiterate as a way of being that demands to be reconsidered and resituated 
within our understanding of language, aesthetic theory, and ecological thought.    
 Remember in the first chapter of this thesis, when I introduced Eva-Maria 
Simms? In “Questioning the Value of Literacy,” she explains how “reading and writing 
seem to be harmless, innocuous skills, mere addenda to the basket of natural skills that 
children develop throughout their formative year.” However, when the agreed upon value 
of literacy is stripped away and the question of how literacy affects our consciousness 
and relationship with the world is posed, there is, in her own words, “a surprising silence 
on this topic.”92 This silence she points to is what Edmund Husserl would call an example 
of our “natural attitude”93 about literacy: viz. that it is useful and necessary for 
communication in our day to day activities, and so is accepted without reflection or 
concern. In suspending as she calls it, “the goodness of literacy,” and engaging in a 
phenomenological analysis of the act of being literate – which she defines as “the ability 
to read and produce written text” – I believe she’s on the right path toward breaking 
down the binary of literacy and illiteracy, specifically by focusing on the body and the 
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way in which literacy and illiteracy influence bodily perception and environmental 
attunement. In this chapter, I will also be working out from the body in order to undo the 
dichotomy constructed between literacy and illiteracy, and to map the consequences of 
incorporating my diagrammatic-aesthetic description of the relationship between literacy 
and illiteracy. In particular, I will be exploring how the emergence of literacy as 
scripturality reified a bounded-ness of the body, and how a different conception of 
literacy problematizes that bounded-ness. I will also be exploring how the diagrammatic 
conception of literacy and illiteracy introduced in chapter two clears a space for me to 
move literacies past the human and to consider the consequences of symbolisms and 
literacies that don’t require human concepts, or even epistemology, to be operationalized. 
These two consequences presuppose that literacy and illiteracy are not functions of the 
human mind. The body, then, is the place to start this chapter.  
At the beginning of his work, Parables for the Virtual, Brian Massumi writes, 
“when I think of my body and ask what it does to earn that name, two things stand out. It 
moves. It feels.”94 Threading together an intrinsic connection between movement and 
sensation, Massumi also entwines the body with change, writing: “the slightest most 
literal displacement convokes a qualitative difference… as directly as it conducts itself it 
beckons a feeling… [and qualitative difference is] change.”95 In other words, even with 
the slightest of movements, a body will feel something, and it is this feeling or emotion 
that conveys and is experienced as change. By explaining that the body can move and 
feel, Massumi sets up what he will call a paradox within the body recognized as an 
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organism: that is, that “the ultimate paradox of the dynamic unity of movement and 
sensation” … [is that the] “unity is purely virtual.”9697  
If we’re to take Massumi at his word, then this means that each body and 
organism necessarily interacts with and exists in the realm of the virtual. Further, if all 
bodies are either literate or illiterate bodies, then this also means that there must be a 
connection between literacy and illiteracy that passes through and is influenced by the 
virtual. In other words, in a move past phenomenology, I am arguing that the virtual is a 
necessary quality of being and becoming that allows for an understanding of language as 
part of a symbolic of affect. This is because, in my understanding, the virtual is the space 
that is created by the aesthetic currents being felt and then refracted back out by 
individual organisms.  
As Deleuze writes, the virtual realm is “an aggregate of noncausal 
correspondences which form a system of echoes, of resumptions and resonances, a 
system of signs… an excessive quasi-causality.”98  The virtual, transcendental realm 
itself is made up of – and is analogous to – the symbolic itself, in that both presuppose an 
aesthetic undercurrent of apprehension that is both dynamic and unpredictable, but also 
always happening and allowing apprehension – and reality – to be. This connection and 
communication via the virtual realm is also corroborated by Steven Shaviro when he 
writes that, “alongside the actual material ‘connection’ of physical causes to one another, 
there is also a virtual relation, or a ‘bond’ linking ‘effects or incorporeal events’ among 
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themselves.”99 Aesthetic feelings are always already there then – in the virtual realm – 
and when they influence the actual realm (of the body), they create newness and 
concrescences. This includes the way in which language influences us – it will 
necessarily always make us feel something – meaning the virtual covers language, and all 
things, like a coat of paint, conducting currents with the aesthetic. I also submit that the 
virtual breaks down the boundedness of the body to show that there’s a permeability 
inherent to both – and in between – the literate-body and illiterate-body, and that these 
bodies qua body can be understood as different actualities conditioned by a symbolic of 
affect, while still existing within a common, dynamic virtuality (the horizontality 
referenced in chapter two) that is our reality as perceived vertically. In other words, the 
virtual realm surrounds the x-axis of organisms and aids in the conducting of movement 
on the y-axis of each type of literacy that is aesthetically created and felt by each 
organism.  
It’s in and through the virtual realm, which is also the realm of the aesthetic and is 
what allows symbolisms to emerge, that Whitehead is able to posit that “the basis of 
experience is emotional”100 and that, as Shaviro writes, “even though the ‘thing in itself’ 
is unknowable, or unrecognizable, nevertheless it affects us in a particular way . . . and 
expressing ‘the way we are affected,’ space and time establish immanent, noncognitive 
connections among objects, between the object and the subject, and between the subject 
and itself.”101 This means that every prehension, which is coincident with symbolism, is 
made up of three different factors: the subject prehending (the body), the datum 
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experienced, and the ‘subjective form’ which is how the subject prehends the datum.”102 
This how is the new concept of literacy I’m submitting: with literacy understood as the 
way in which each organism aesthetically feels, moves, and responds to the rest of the 
world on the x-axis. Indeed, the ‘thing in itself’ that Shaviro is referencing is, in my own 
view, the aesthetic, and what is established through space and time (on the x-axis) are the 
many different literacies.  
While we’ll remember that Simms provided us with a general definition of 
literacy – that is, the ability to read and write – a more robust definition will help us move 
forward as we continue to grapple with the virtual and my diagrammatic 
conceptualization of literacy and illiteracy. In particular, it’s important for me to 
explicitly describe the problem with the current definition of literacy. In his work, The 
World on Paper, David Olsen argues that literacy is “competence with a script,” and that 
“we may think of literacy as both a cognitive and a social condition, the ability to 
participate actively in a community of readers who have agreed on some principle of 
reading, a hermeneutics if you will, a set of texts to be treated as significant and a 
working agreement on the appropriate or valid interpretation(s) of those texts.”103 Such a 
definition while comprehensive for the literate-body, calls for a negative extrapolation 
when inverted in an attempt to define the illiterate-body. By following Olsen’s definition, 
it would have to be assumed that the illiterate-body is one that would be “unable to 
participate actively” in a community of readers – a definition that would sequester the 
illiterate as the “negative other” as compared to the “positive” or “valuable” literate-
body. It is in this lacuna of meaning or value for the illiterate-body that the previous 
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chapter problematizes, and this chapter explores more deeply. This “lack of meaning” in 
defining the illiterate-body acts as evidence for the inherent problem of putting 
epistemology underneath ontology. In other words, literacy and illiteracy can no longer 
be understood as strictly a part of the realm of epistemology; rather, we must open up our 
understanding of illiteracy as also always a part of, and influencing, our status as an 
ontological being on the horizontal axis to even begin to talk about the epistemic as such, 
since the epistemic necessarily categorizes: naming one thing so as to differentiate it from 
the many other things that surround it. In order to begin exploring the consequences of 
the move of folding literacy and illiteracy into each other on the horizontal x-axis, and 
recognizing that there are an indefinite number of literacies that move out past any 
literacy understood as human, it’s necessary to begin breaking down the myth 
surrounding the individual in thought – that is, the boundary between the I-Self, and the 
Self-as-always-Other. For this move, a necessarily rhetorical one (as I’ll argue), I turn to, 
first, David Abram’s work, and then to rhetorician, Diane Davis.  
As I introduced in chapter two, Abram follows the history of literacy and the 
types of effects it had on the human psyche. Most importantly for this chapter, Abram 
notes how literacy established an inside/outside binary that placed the bounded body on 
one side of a relationship with the more-than-human-world, and that allowed the human 
body and the world itself to be written upon. In establishing this emergence of a 
dichotomy in critical thought, I’m interested in subverting the perceived boundedness of 
the body via a rhetorical critique. In the introduction to her work, Inessential Solidarity, 
Diane Davis writes that her task is to “expose a solidarity that precedes symbolicity,” an 
originary (or preoriginary) rhetoricity – “an affectability or persuadability – that is the 
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condition for symbolic action.”104 This “irreparable openness to affection/alteration”105 is 
what Davis will call – citing Lucretius – the clinamen,106 in and through which symbol-
sharing-beings – literate and illiterate-bodies – are brought into being. Davis comes to 
this observation by citing Jean-Luc Nancy, when he writes that “one cannot make the 
world with simple atoms”;107 rather, in order for a world to exist – especially, in Davis’s 
case, a world with communicative human beings – there must be a kind of sensus 
communis though which symbol-sharing beings, and beings with bodies who both feel 
and move, are able to recognize and respond to each other – at one and the same time 
communicating and co-creating both each other and their environment.   
The concept of the clinamen is useful for our purposes in breaking down the 
boundedness of the body by positing that the self as “I” is only ever brought into being by 
responding to the “Other” – a breaking down of outside/inside, or in other words the 
boundaries of the body. However, Davis posits that the symbolic comes after, or is only 
possible in the wake of the originary response-ability to the other that brings “me” into 
being. In contrast, Whitehead will argue that, “the human mind is functioning 
symbolically when some components of its experience elicit consciousness, beliefs, 
emotions, and usages, respecting other components of its experience.”108 
In other words, Whitehead is arguing that the experience of the world for the 
human mind is always mediated via symbolism, not just after experiencing the presence 
of another human being who calls me into question, but from the moment of birth.  
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With Whitehead, the very sense of extension is itself a symbolism, and symbolism 
is working at every level of being continuously. Suzanne Langer in her work, Philosophy 
in a New Key, corroborates this point of Whitehead’s when she references A.D. Ritchie: 
“As far as thought is concerned, and at all levels of thought,109 it [mental life] is a 
symbolic process… the essential act of thought is symbolization.”110 What this means, 
then, is that it’s not the “Other” (or the symbol-sharing-human being, per say) that 
Davis’s main argument calls for that breaks down the boundedness of the body and that 
makes me a me. Rather, it’s all things that elicit consciousness, beliefs, or emotions – in 
other words, everything that makes us a body. And this everything is, arguably, all things 
that make up the world itself, humans and non-humans, sentient and non-sentient 
organisms alike. This excerpt by Ritchie signifies, too, that there is no threshold into the 
symbolic. The symbolic, rather, is concomitant with every level – every gradation – of 
epistemology until we drill down into ontology. This also means, too, that Davis’s 
concept of response-ability can be married to and made concomitant with Whitehead’s 
theory of symbolism, meaning that both are co-travelers with each other, each happening 
at one and the same time. The ethical component of Davis’s argument – i.e. that we are 
beholden to the other symbol-using being well before we even begin to communicate 
with and know them – can be extended and attributed to all interactions that presuppose 
symbol-sharing or existing-together: meaning that we’re also ethically inclined towards, 
and in solidarity with, both organic and inorganic beings at all times. It is necessary with 
these thoughts in mind, however, to more deeply explore the implications such a 
																																																						
109	This means, then, that there is no threshold into the symbolic, through which thought crosses. Rather, 
the symbolic is concomitant with the ontological nature of all things before any privileging of epistemology 
takes place.  
110 Ritchie, The Natural History of the Mind, 278-279.  
		 76	
synthesis of response-ability and symbolicity have on our understanding of our use of, 
and discourse around, symbols and thoughts. With this exploration in mind, I turn to 
Langer.  
In exploring symbolization, Langer marks a difference of degree between signs 
and symbols. She writes that the “use of signs is the very first manifestation of mind… as 
soon as sensations function as signs of conditions in the surrounding world, the animal 
receiving them is moved to exploit or avoid those conditions.”111 If we think back to 
Massumi and his observation that a body both moves and feels, and we put him into 
conversation with Langer’s observation that signs and sensations inspire movement, then 
we begin to notice that a body only moves because of its feeling/sensation and its use of 
signs. Langer goes on to establish a degree of difference between signs and symbols by 
writing that “most of our words are not signs in the sense of signals… they serve, rather, 
to let us develop a characteristic attitude towards objects in absentia, which is called 
‘thinking of’ or ‘referring to’… ‘signs’ in this capacity are… symbols.”112 What Langer 
allows us to say, then, is that there is an ontological, aesthetic kinship between humans 
and animals, indeed between all things that sense and react and persist in time and space. 
And this kinship is the horizontal x-axis in my diagrammatic model. Considered on this 
axis, an indefinite number of organisms equally make use of signs and symbols although 
they necessarily showcase profound aesthetic variation in practice, which is 
acknowledged via the vertical axis of differentiated literacies. Rather than any sort of 
opposition when it comes to literacy and illiteracy, the difference between being-literate 
and being-illiterate is all about aesthetic variations and continuities, not ontological 
																																																						
111 Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 29.  
112 Ibid., 31.  
		 77	
separations that set up a dichotomous model of epistemology. Put more simply, literacy 
and illiteracy are not separate from each other – any dichotomous organization of literacy 
and illiteracy ignores the aesthetic-symbolic connection. Rather, they are immanent to 
and continuous with each other, just like the many different depths and ecosystems found 
in the ocean, and different literacies are dependent upon the types of aesthetic 
experiences each organism can biologically experience. This continuity across or by 
virtue of movement in – and interaction with – the world is indicated by the fact that 
symbols are predicated on signs, which are predicated by sensations functioning 
symbolically. By way of Langer, I submit that the aesthetic is the ontological ground of 
the symbolic, and that rather than the literate-body being diametrically opposed to the 
illiterate-body, there are instead degrees of aesthetic variation in how symbol use is 
executed within an organism’s being-in-the-world, including their ability to move within 
and apprehend the world writ large.113 And these aesthetic variations, in turn, allow for 
there to be different kinds of literacies produced and experienced simultaneously by each 
individual organism.  
To return to Whitehead and Davis, this recognition of a difference of degrees 
between signs and symbols establishes a set of gradations of adjustment in how we 
project (and understand/experience) our spatial and temporal world – one that is premised 
on the sensation of the aesthetic, and one that necessarily needs to incorporate more than 
just the human Other. In a move towards breaking down the anthropocentric 
inside/outside conceptualization that literacy and illiteracy’s contemporary definitions 
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have created and that have, in turn, been mapped onto the body, Whitehead will write that 
each individual thing in the world is a “concrete moment” only because of its relationship 
with other “concrete moments” via presentational immediacy, causal efficacy, and 
locality. Here, Whitehead recognizes presentational immediacy as that which we perceive 
with our sensory apparatuses in the moment, without any sort of temporal thickness, 
while casual efficacy is “the overwhelming conformation of fact, in present action, to 
antecedent settled fact.”114 That is to say that each organism that makes up the world is 
always beholden to the previous moment, in which all organisms continued to 
communicate with each other aesthetically and contributed to reality writ large. Locality, 
in Whitehead’s terms, refers to where an organism is positioned within the world. 
Whitehead writes that each individual organism – i.e. human beings, animals, objects – 
“arises from its determinate relativity to the settled world of other concrete 
individuals.”115 What Whitehead’s thoughts allow me to do, then, is to still hold onto the 
clinamen that Davis introduces, while also inflating it to include all other organisms or 
“concrete moments.” All things, then, in Whitehead’s terms and in Davis’s terms, inspire 
a pre-originary rhetoricity, a persuasiveness that is entwined with the aesthetic conditions 
that allow organisms to move and to feel, which gives rise to divergent literacies. This 
space past an exclusively human Other is what Whitehead will call “a community of 
organisms… [and] the community as an environment is responsible for the survival of 
the separate individuals that compose it; and these separate individuals are responsible 
for their contributions to the environment.”116  
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In other words, (to glance back at Langer’s gradient of signs and symbols and to 
put her in conversation with Whitehead) understanding communities as made up of 
individual organisms that are all response-able to each other sets up the argument that the 
complexity of symbol-use is constructed as a gradient of aesthetic variation – grounded 
on an aesthetic-ontological similarity. It’s only through a shared ontology and 
symbolicity (which are co-travelers – you can’t have one without the other) that each of 
our experienced literacies are able to exist as such, and be co-created as a communal 
affect, since each literacy would also be contingent upon other literacies as well as 
illiteracies.    
Davis’s response-ability and Whitehead’s symbolicity are part of the same 
phenomenon of apprehending the world, and contribute to the creation of multiple kinds 
of literacies. This move also begins to show the necessary non-human turn in this way of 
thinking about symbolism, in that symbolism can no longer be sequestered to the mind of 
the human only, but is also a necessary part of every object’s – both sentient and non-
sentient – ontological experience of the world. Obviously, humans aren’t the only 
organisms thinking and feeling in the world – there are animals, trees, and bacteria. If 
we’re to follow the implications of my argument and include all organisms that make up 
the world, this would also include non-sentient objects, for example, rocks. With the 
indefinite number of organisms and objects that make up reality each experiencing their 
own literacies, while incorporating Whitehead’s conception of symbolism and the 
aesthetic at the base of the ontological, the next move is to consider the implications of 
the epistemic in relationship to literacy. Thinking, per Langer, is predicated on signs. 
Signs are a unit of symbolicity. Symbolicity is dependent upon aesthetic experience. In 
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order to move with and exist in the world (the clinamen), all entities necessarily feel and 
respond at some level. If we think about the influence symbolism (and within the 
symbolic, literacy and illiteracy) has on our general understanding of apprehension and 
co-creation of reality, then there must be a careful consideration of the validity of what is 
now referred to as panpsychism, or the more-than-human distribution of consciousness as 
a metaphysically necessary principle.   
In definition literacy, Olsen writes that it is “a hermeneutics.” For Shaviro, in 
laying out Whitehead’s theory of affect, the problem with “hermeneutical modes of 
interpretation”117 is that they reduce what is not yet known to an ignorance, a lack, much 
like the illiterate-body. In replacing the basis of experience with feeling, rather than 
cognition – as Whitehead and Davis both do – the act of symbol use (language) demands 
to be understood as aesthetic (or as a symbolic of affect). As a result, the subjective 
experiences – and subjective forms – of the illiterate-body and the literate-body demand 
to be understood as immanent to existence, that is, part of a gradient of symbolic 
prehension, rather than a binary that has no way of influencing the other.  
Beginning a conversation about the relationship between literacy and 
panpsychism is important in that it subverts the narrative that there is only one kind of 
way in which to define literacy. In not so many words, panpsychism posits that 
consciousness is a universal feature of all things – varying in degrees of complexity, but 
universal nonetheless. This premise undercuts the prioritizing of certain kinds of literacy 
– such as an anthropocentrically, epistemologically centered reading and writing literacy 
– and instead opens up the concept of literacy to a whole field of possibility: for example, 
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what literacies must a tree possess to exist as it does? How does an animal, a mollusk 
perhaps, experience literacy? How so with a neutrino, et al.? If we’re to take seriously 
that the symbolic is concomitant with ontology, then all things and organisms are reacting 
to and affected aesthetically and symbolically, meaning that there necessarily must be a 
way in which they respond to and create something from their interaction with the 
symbolic and the aesthetic. That kind of dynamic, to me, seems like a literacy of sorts – 
one that moves outside of our own limited kind of literacy and that begins to talk to and 
about the indefinite x-axis of organisms and the y-axis of their literacies that I referenced 
in chapter two. And the indefinite number of ways in which each kind of organism 
responds to the world and creates a literacy of variety that is necessarily dependent upon 
the kinds of sensory apparatuses – or lack thereof – each individual organism has for its 
use. Talk of the sensory apparatuses available to each organism – or their own biological 
complexity – also incorporates the z-axis. This is because the z-axis – which is the 
ontological scope that each literacy develops over time and space –  has layers of 
complexity. Other kinds of literacies created and then experienced by less biologically 
complex organisms may not be as intense or function as being-scriptural, for example. 
No matter the level of complexity or intensity of each literacy, each literacy is 
fundamentally dependent upon the experience of the symbolic, which every organism 
necessary always already can experience. It’s important to stress this point because this 
means, then, that literacy extends all the way up the ontological food chain to the very 
complex, and all the way back down to the very basic. And this applies to both literacies 
created by individual organisms – in that literacies can be more complex than other kinds 
of literacies – and the organisms themselves, in that certain organisms are more complex 
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than other organism, ergo experiencing and producing more complex symbolisms and 
literacies. By discriminating the different kinds of symbolisms, I’m able to state that even 
though some symbolic experiences will feel more basic so as to be considered a priori for 
the complex organism, like the human, that doesn’t mean that they aren’t also creating a 
kind of literacy, which in turn also contributes to the complexity of the many other kinds 
of literacies being created. In that regard, I argue there is no hierarchy of literacies when 
it comes to symbolic experience and expression. Instead, there is an open field of 
symbolic possibilities and potentialities, all of which are harmonizing together to create a 
world in which there is the possibility for new literacies, and more generally, newness of 
feeling, expression and experience.  
This possibility includes, then, being-illiterate as always already a way of being 
that each individual organism can’t escape since each organism can’t possibly be able to 
experience what it is like to be a different organism. For example, surely there is some 
way of being that is specific to being a tree: it is like something to be a tree, out of which 
specific kinds of literacy – specific kinds of ways in which symbolic affect is understood 
and felt and responded to – is constantly becoming. For the human, this kind of literacy 
can only ever be tangentially felt through our own literacy; we are functionally illiterate 
in – but still affected by – the literacy of a tree. In each moment, the symbolic has to do 
with the way in which a body interprets – both physically and mentally – the world 
around it. Indeed, as Whitehead explains, every entity is “essentially dipolar”118 with a 
physical pole and a mental pole situated in a body. That is to say that there is a constant 
mediation between the physical and the mental – one does not exist or work without the 
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other. This also means, then, that the literate-body and the illiterate-body – which are 
both already always symbolically sensitive and structured – would each be influenced 
aesthetically by shifts in symbolic degrees. In other words, as Shaviro writes, “every 
entity’s simple physical feelings are supplemented by its conceptual feelings.”119 The 
symbolic always has to do with how a body responds to and moves through the world. 
The response and the movement of the entity, in my reconceptualization of literacy, 
corresponds directly with the various kinds of aesthetic prehensions available to each 
entity, and the kind of literacies that come out of those experiences. For example, the 
rock will understand and react to its environment via its specific kind of literacy – a 
literacy that is both dependent on and influencing the environment and the many other 
kinds of literacies concurrently taking place and coalescing. And while these literacies 
are all influencing each other, they are dependent upon each other. This relationship 
between many different types of literacies all co-creating while co-existing together 
points towards an aesthetic of separation, in that each literacy experienced contributes to 
the symbolic itself – and the many layers of symbolic gradation that correspond to the 
many different actualities that sentient and non-sentient organisms represent – beginning 
to self-divide and create different distributions (or gradations) of the sensible world, 
which spin-off, creating new ways in which to experience the symbolic, effectively new 
kinds of literacies.  
A turn towards Jacques Ranciere helps clarify the immanent, osmotic relationship 
between literacy and illiteracy that I’m arguing for. He writes in his work, The Politics of 
Aesthetics, “To pretend is not to put forth illusions, but to elaborate intelligible 
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structures.”120And what is literacy if not a pretending at what is already the intelligible 
structures of the world, as we noted in chapter two? The creation of a veritable symbolic 
structure that attempts to capture the aesthetic experiences always already before and 
inspiring the symbolic reactions? It could be argued, then, as Ranciere does about the 
aesthetic revolution of the Romantic Age, that the emergence of literacy effectively 
“[blurred] the borders between the logic of facts and the logic of fictions”121 and made 
the science of history dependent upon this blurring. Further, literacy has created a regime 
of meaning that has become completely dependent upon literacy itself as the primary 
mode of communication contemporaneously and through time, and that has gone almost 
completely un-challenged and un-examined since it started its work with the advent of 
the Guttenburg press in the 15th century. This kind of regime has since created the 
emergence of other, new regimes of the aesthetic, as Ranciere points out, since the human 
being is “a political animals because he is a literary animal who lets himself [sic] be 
diverted from his ‘natural’ purpose by the power of words.” What happens with literacy, 
then, as Ranciere will argue, is that the actual body of the illiterate and the literate – 
situated within the regime of meaning saturated with literacy – is overtaken by literary 
locutions, which themselves define “variations of sensible intensities, perceptions, and 
the abilities of [these] bodies”?122 These bodies, in turn, become quasi-bodies, or bodies 
that produce “lines of fracture and disincorporation into imaginary collective bodies123” 
which is to say, new “regimes” of the sensible in the already imaginary regime of 
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literacy, situated atop the feeling and sensing body itself. Literacy, then, creates a 
landscape of signs and symbols in which the “map of the sensible” is reconfigured, due to 
literacy “interfering with the functionality of gestures and rhythms.”124 If we remember 
back to chapter two, this landscape that Ranciere is referring to is the way in which the 
experience of the world (the vertical y-axis), is influenced by the intensity and becoming-
intense of the x-axis, establishing veritable symbolic structures on top of an organism’s 
experience of the world as they are constantly-becoming by feeling and moving. And as 
I’ve been arguing, this applies to each individual organism: each of which has varying 
literacies of varying complexity and intensity. 
In order to establish a better visual that incorporates both lines (from my 
diagrammatic understanding of literacy) and spheres of experiencing literacy for each 
organism, I conceptualize my own understanding of literacy as a synthesis of both 
Ranciere’s ‘regimes’ and the biologist Jakob von Uexküll’s umwelts. Agamben 
references von Uexküll when he writes “where classical science saw a single world that 
comprised within it all living species… Uexküll instead supposes an infinite variety of 
perceptual worlds, that, though they are uncommunicating and reciprocally exclusive, are 
all equally perfect and linked together, as if in a gigantic musical score.”125 Like 
concentric circles, each environment experienced by each individual entity – from as 
biologically complex as a human, to as “simple” as a rock – and each literacy that is 
created by each feeling and moving organism, harmonize together. The description of 
“perceptual worlds” by Agamben presupposes an organism’s ability to perceive – an act 
that, following Langer and Whitehead, is concomitant with symbol-use and symbol-
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sharing. As Whitehead writes in his work, Modes of Thought, in his chapter on 
“perspective,” “every form in its very nature refers to some sort of realization… thus the 
forms are essentially referent beyond themselves… the realm of forms is the realm of 
potentiality, and the very notion of potentiality has an external meaning. It refers to life 
and motion (development of actuality).”126 In other words, each “perceptual world” that 
is created and experienced by each organism is real (actual), in that it is also potential, 
referring beyond itself in space and time to other actualities that are also potentialities 
admixed together in a soup of affect, and that create meaning out of that affect via 
symbolisms. Actualities, then, as Whitehead shows us, are actual only because of their 
communication – via potentiality – with other actualities. This conceptualization provides 
another way in which to think about the many degrees of aesthetic variation when it 
comes to apprehending the world as such – that is, the many different kinds of literacies 
possible and constantly becoming. The symbolic - which literacy and illiteracy are 
mutually entangled gradations of – is not in the epistemological mind, but is a necessary 
ontological aspect of an organism’s being that corresponds with the many, immanent 
layers of apprehension and feeling that each organism necessarily experiences.  
And these different types of perceptions and prehensions that correspond with the 
layers of feelings presuppose different kinds of prehensive formations which correlate 
with Deleuze and Guattari when they write that each “singular” organism isn’t singular, 
but rather is, from the outset, a multitude. This is an important point, because both 
Ranciere’s quasi-bodies and Agamben’s reference of umwelts both can be confused as 
presupposing an already constructed body that is then influenced by an “outside” source. 
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What Deleuze and Guattari clear up for us is that the body, also, is an always dynamic, 
affecting amalgam of its positionality (locality) and complexity. Each individual 
organism is an assemblage: a shifting constellation of feelings and senses that can, at 
specific, kairotic moments, feel other parts of reality or other literacies, creating new 
experiences and feelings that shift and change reality – (like ecosystems, for example) – 
and the assemblage of the individual organism itself. Fundamentally, though, the 
individual organism is always immanent with and continuous with the plane of 
immanence, and that’s what I’m arguing for when I talk about literacy and illiteracy. 
Being literate or illiterate are themselves not thresholds in the way an organism 
experiences reality, but instead are aesthetic gradations of environmental adjustment 
towards how each organism changes its own assemblage amidst the flat ontology of 
reality, or what Deleuze and Guatarri will call the plane of immanence – just like 
Ranciere’s various regimes are themselves indicative of these changing assemblages. As 
Deleuze and Guattari write “in a book, in all things, there are lines of articulation, strata 
and territories; but also lines of flight, movements of de-territorialization and de-
stratification . . .  all this, lines and measurable speeds constitute an assemblage.”127 The 
book, then, is an assemblage itself, just as each organism in the world is an assemblage, 
situated on the plane of immanence in which “assemblages combine in a regime of signs 
or a semiotic machine.”128 These various assemblages of signs which create the way the 
literate-body and illiterate-body interact with the world are themselves influenced by the 
way in which a body responds to signs itself, however. That is to say, these assemblages 
of signs create literacies. And this makes sense in terms of mimetic evolution, in which 
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Peckham writes that “as evolutionary development increases and more complex 
organisms come into existence as a result of that randomness, the brain’s potentiality for 
randomness accumulates and increases with each emerging species.”129 And with the 
emergence of literacy, humans-beings were already selected for survival – with literacy 
being a supplement to what is already a regime of meaning, and what becomes a 
distribution of the sensible for the majority of humans who have the potential to 
experience the world as mediated by the prehensive formation of literacy, which itself 
corresponds back to the various umwelts that all harmonize with each other to create a 
reality writ large that allows each of its organisms and aesthetic prehensions to continue 
to happen and vibrate. In other words, literacy is just another way in which a felt world is 
created – a distribution of the sensible, and then a regime of the sensible – that is both 
continuous with (in that it harmonizes with other worlds of aesthetic variation) and 
affectively different than other umwelts in that the distribution of the sensible within a 
specific literacy correlates with the actual organisms’ sense modalities. In other words, 
there are an infinite number of literacies in which there are regimes and umwelts – (I like 
the idea of spheres of aesthetic prehension, which can coalesce and create larger spheres 
in and through which individual actualities experience regimes) – all of which are always 
open to each other, influencing and affecting.  
This re-orientation of the way in which we understand and talk about our being-
in-the-world will have consequences for how we conceptualize our many relationships: 
with the land, with ourselves and others, and with every type of community we identify – 
ideologically, ecologically or geographically – as a part of. Mapping these different types 
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of relationships will be the work of the next chapter. Specifically, the hope is to begin to 
try and open up our different symbolisms – (that we’ve started to talk about in this 
chapter) – so as to see where one can work across symbolisms, and where there might 
already be overlapping experiences that we hadn’t attended to before. The space has been 
created, however, in our reconceptualization of literacy and illiteracy, so that we to begin 
seeing where there may be aesthetic similarities and openings in experience. These kinds 
of similarities and connections will be, in the end, what contribute to constructing a new 
pragmatic, pedagogical system that addresses the teaching of literacy in a different, more 
aesthetic way.  
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CHAPTER V 
ECOLOGY OF LANDSCAPE & LANGUAGE: RE-SITUATING RELATIONALITY 
 
Consequences of Re-Situation for Relation 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I argued for breaking down the theoretical boundary 
between inside and outside, and the dichotomy between subject and object if we are to 
feel (and understand) literacy and illiteracy as immanent with each other. I situated 
symbolicity in the body as concomitant with aesthetic prehension, which allows for 
communication and affectability between organisms. In this chapter, I will be navigating 
the consequences of this reorientation of symbolicity. What may be extrapolated from the 
premise that the symbolic is a co-traveler with ontology? For instance, how does human 
relationship to the land change when we begin to think of symbolicity as synonymous 
with the aesthetic? What happens to our relationship to our self and the Other? And to 
push this thought of the “Other” further, what becomes of our relationship to community? 
Do normative literate, rhetorical discourses gloss over an important aspect of community 
that a symbolic of affect (re)discovers? I will address these questions in this chapter so as 
to begin tracing the consequences of resituating literacy and illiteracy for pedagogical 
theory.   
  
Relationship to Land 
 
  Towards the beginning of the introduction to his work, Ambient Rhetoric, Rickert 
writes: “A mind needs a body, and a body needs a world… we do not have a body; we 
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are bodily. We do not have a world; we are worldly.”130 On first pass, this seems like a 
philosophical platitude: few would argue that this progression of needs is nonsensical. 
The relationship between mind, body, and world is important to Rickert’s description of 
“ambient rhetoric.” For my purposes, I’m interested in tying ambience to literacy, 
establishing an “ambient literacy” that allows one to imagine scriptural literacy in direct 
communication with the many other literacies that exist (in what I have described as a 
horizontal relationship). To add on to Rickert’s poetic sentence, then, I’d add that we “do 
not have literacy, we are already literate” just as we “do not have illiteracy, we are also 
always already illiterate.”  
 Rickert states that “Rhetoric can no longer remain centered on its theoretical 
common places such as rhetor/subject, and audience … rather, it must diffuse outward to 
include the material environment, things (including the technological), our own 
embodiment, and a complex understanding of ecological relationality as participating in 
rhetorical practices and their theorizations.”131 To understand the way in which different 
bodies interact each other and how that interaction is shaped and “stabilized” by the 
environment, we must understand our being-in-the-world as part of a complex, dynamic 
entanglement. This entanglement is what enables and even compels us. Taking into 
consideration the complex ways that literacies and their attendant rhetorics are influenced 
by ecological forces, literacy must become more conceptually diffuse. Indeed, we should 
move past an anthropocentric lens and “attend to the ways that the body and the local 
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environments are literally built into the processing loops that result in intelligent 
action,”132 which involves being-literate in a variety of forms of symbolisms.  
 Relying on Rickert’s concept of ambient rhetoric I nonetheless want to make a 
move that Rickert rejects: namely, making symbolism concomitant with ontology. 
Rickert’s ambience informs my own attempt at an “ambient literacy.” Instead of arguing 
for a rhetorical agency that is diffuse into the environment and prior to symbolic 
communication, I will keep ambient rhetoric and rhetorical agency tethered to 
symbolism, keeping ontology as a co-traveler with symbolism always. To the extent that 
all things exist materially, so too do they have and exercise symbolic agency. Each entity 
is embodied, and its embodiment requires that it engage symbolically with its 
surroundings. This symbolic agency necessarily evolves types of literacy.  
 As Rickert writes, “while perception remains important to understanding 
ambience, other important aspects include feeling, mood, intuition, and decision making. 
This gets us to the issue of attunement.”133 While Rickert relies heavily on a 
Heideggerian understanding of attunement, I argue that attunement can be understood as 
a sensitivity to what Whitehead will call feeling, which is, as Shaviro explains, “all the 
ways in which entities interact with one another, or affect one another.”134  
 Describing ambience as affective attunement, Rickert echoes Whitehead writing 
that “feelings, whether they are socially refracted and circulated emotions or the more 
deep-seated moods characterizing how we find ourselves, are neither subsidiary to human 
existence nor impediment to rational activity … they are fundamental.”135 My contention 
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picks up when he begins to separate out the various ways in which ambient attunement is 
prior to the symbolic, as if the symbolic has to be kept strictly within the realm of 
anthropocentric epistemology.  
 There are significant implications to understanding symbolism and thought as no 
longer strictly human attributes, but what I’d like to focus on is how such a way of 
thinking impacts consideration of the experience of being literate. Particularly, I’d like to 
explore what Rickert calls the “kairotic” moment, where, citing Debra Hawhee, he writes, 
“one invents and is invented, one writes and is written, constitutes and is constituted.”136 
Such an understanding of kairos focuses on “the rhetorical encounter itself and the forces 
pushing on the encounter.”137 If we’re to think of an indefinite number of entities 
participating in each type of literacy, symbolism is integral to how each entity feels each 
moment, and literacy is the way in which it moves in reaction to those feelings. Situated 
within this larger conception of literacy, each entity is like a fractal, swirling out to be 
affected by other entities contingent to specific kairotic moments. There’s no telling what 
will happen when one enacts a given form of literacy – concomitant with movement, 
feeling and symbolic experience are radically open, continuously encountering new kinds 
of tensions and interactions. Novelty is created with these new relations and through the 
material communication that accompanies them. We are, then, always written while 
writing – always read while reading. Reading and writing are always being influenced by 
the other symbolisms that always already condition our own. Being-scriptural is thus 
embedded in a much larger world of “reading” and “writing.”  
																																																						
136 Hawhee, Kairotic Encounters, 18.  
137 Ibid., 25.  
		 94	
The purpose and value of relationships with the land (understood here as nature, 
writ large) – of situating writing and reading and art and thought back into the land and 
listening, being attuned – is to trace the places where our thought begins to break down, 
and where we can begin to feel more deeply those other realms of perception in which the 
overall value intensity is upheld by individuals who value themselves. In those moments, 
new concepts will be made, and the concrescence of our relationship to the land will 
continue to move, always fluid, always dynamic, by attempting to write and read into and 
out of these spaces and feelings. This way, we may, as David Abram suggests, better 
replant our scriptural language and literacy back into the more-than-human-world. 
 
Relationship to Self / Other 
 
Having explored what Whitehead would call the “Great Outdoors” of theory and 
how it reconnects to literacy theory, I will next consider the ways in which a reorientation 
of symbolism changes our relationship to the body. I return to Brian Massumi in order to 
work through the complex relationship “one” has with his or her body as a moving, 
sensing, seemingly-bounded apparatus for existence. Massumi writes that the two things 
that stand out when we begin to question what the body itself is are that it moves and that 
it feels. He echoes Whitehead when he states that “feelings have a way of folding into 
each other, resonating with each other, resonating together, interfering with each other, 
mutually intensifying, all in unquantifiable ways apt to unfold again in action.”138 This 
raises the question of how a body moves – and, more generally, through what and in what 
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ways does a body move? Answers to such a question will have implications in regards to 
my more broad argument for an affective symbolism that is concomitant with the 
ontological at every level of complexity, especially as I work to consider the ways in 
which I may connect the body, its interactions, its movements, its noises and its feelings 
with current conceptions of literacy studies and literacy pedagogy. 
Massumi questions the validity of understanding the body as socially constructed, 
for example, male or female, black or white, human or nonhuman, etc. The problem with 
such a geography of identity, he explains, is that it freezes the body within a pre-coded, 
ideologically organized framework that treats the body like a game piece without there 
being any exploration of new territory. In short, there isn’t any creativity. Concepts 
correlate with pre-coded categories, and who I am is mediated via interpellation. There is 
“gridlock.” From an artistically aesthetic point of view, if there were a master-
ideological-code that controlled the movement of bodies, it would follow that artworks, 
writings, and all works of creativity would also correlate with these pre-approved zones 
of feeling. There would not be moments of sublimity or novelty and movement for the 
zeitgeist – and within the zeitgeist, for the symbolic, too – only infinite, recursive loops, 
as if we were skating around and around. A pre-disposed space in and through which the 
body moves would be contradictory to any symbolism of affect. What happens, then, to 
the hypothesized structure when a symbolic of affect is posited? And further, what are the 
consequences of how we relate to, think about, and write/read with the body?  
To side-step the conceptual dead-end that the body as social construct leads one 
into, Massumi posits that “in motion, a body is in an immediate, unfolding relation to its 
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own non-present potential to vary.”139 The body is not so much moving through the grid-
like space of socio-cultural identities, but rather is transitioning, phase-shifting its way 
through the conditions that stabilize the body in each instant. As Whitehead writes, “time 
in the concrete … the conformation of state to state, the later to the earlier.”140 If the body 
is understood as an unfolding process, then it exists as an undetermined state of dynamic 
unity that is captured retrospectively as an object only once a particular moment has 
passed. Whatever stability of the body we perceive, it is felt after the fact as we’re 
unfolding forward again, continuously caught and held and then pushed forward again 
within our entangled affective relations. It’s only when we return to these concepts we’ve 
collected as being unfolds that we freeze the “dynamic unity, the continuity of [the 
earth’s and our] movements.”141 
The body understood as a dynamic, unfolding event has important implications 
for re-thinking the relationship to the body and the symbolic, as well as the symbolic’s 
relationship to literacy and illiteracy. This freezing, Massumi posits, is analogous to only 
viewing one dimension of the reality that is always already unfolding and multitudinous: 
like looking through a kaleidoscope and only seeing one color. And yet, as I’ve explored 
with the emergence of literacy through time, we have mistaken the history of writing, 
fundamentally the history of an indefinite number of concepts, as ontology – as the 
capital-t truth, rather than concepts situated in time, that will necessarily co-evolve with 
certain movements, feelings, and kairotic experiences. Reorienting our thought to 
consider scriptural-literacy – reading and writing – as also always evolving and moving 
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and being affected would, I believe, drastically influence the way in which we think 
about and use our own symbolisms – especially our scriptural symbolisms.  
If the symbolic is part and parcel of every experience, then every experience 
requires an organism – in our case, a human body. I then argued that, via Whitehead and 
his notion of symbolic transference, movement itself and the way in which organisms 
interact with each other in the world is dependent upon the symbolic, due to the fact that 
it is only because of a subject or organism’s ability to interpret via causal efficacy their 
surroundings that they are able to persist and keep persisting. In other words, what we 
can begin to do in and through Massumi’s work is trace the symbolic as a co-traveler, 
always, with the body, applying the same ambiguities of movement to the symbolic itself. 
When it comes to the symbolic, like the body and movement, the “emphasis is on process 
before signification or coding.”142 Before the elaboration of the symbolic into codified 
languages that have multiplied and traversed the world, and that were later inked and 
codified into iterations of written form in which literacy was birthed, – which would be 
the freezing that I mentioned in the last paragraph – symbolism was and continues to be a 
process of becoming, just like being itself as a body-organism is.  
Such an understanding of the body and the symbolic flattens out the hierarchies of 
“able-body” and “disabled-body”, of “literate-body” and “illiterate-body.” In other 
words, being-scriptural isn’t unique so much as it is another (powerful) way of 
experiencing literacy for an organism.  
Each way of being and its concomitant modes of literacy is continuous with the 
next, so it follows that each way of being is in constant communication with other 
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organisms and ways of being. These mutually immanent kinds of relationships would 
extend all the way up to more complex entities and all the way down in regards to less 
complex entities. At every level, there’s an “exchange,” an affective engagement that can 
never not happen. The separation of “I” and “Other” and “We” are blurred. We are, then, 
as Derrida would remind us, always already arriving at separation that is incomplete. 
Each of our literacies, especially being-scriptural, is always influenced by the material 
actualities that it comes into contact with, the environments that it inhabits. 
As Massumi writes, the body’s “positionality is an emergent quality of 
movement,”143 meaning that a position, or a concept, or – we may extrapolate as we trace 
the symbolic with the body – a language (and a person’s being-literate or being-illiterate 
in regards to that language/symbolism), is only retroactively created after emerging from 
the flux of reality via a recursive dynamism. Such an observation by Massumi influences 
him to move past using the concept “ontological” in describing concepts like “field,” 
“body,” and “organisms” and to describe them as ontogenetic: i.e. “equal to 
emergence.”144 In other words, flux and indeterminacy – creativity, in Whiteheadian 
parlance – are what keep everything moving, while concepts are created via the 
concrescence that creates a past that is concurrent with the present. That is to say that 
each one of our literacies – since the past is always a harmonizing of all things, and the 
present emerges out of the past – is dependent upon each one of the past actualities that 
continue to be actual via casual efficacy, contributing to the potentialities that individual 
organisms – and by extension, their literacies – may experience.  
																																																						
143 Ibid., 8.  
144	Ibid., 8.  
		 99	
Such a resituating of concepts – the ontological with the ontogenetic – also 
demands a deeper exploration of the “walls” of the body, or the fingertips, as I referenced 
in the last paragraph. As we’ve noticed throughout the last chapter and this chapter, if 
there’s one thing the body does, it “feels” – it senses and experiences sensation. But what 
is sensation underneath sensation? By this I mean, isn’t sensation itself just another 
feeling of a feeling? This question then leads one to ask if the logic behind the semantics 
would go on, ad infinitum until we reached a point in which to declare the argument 
reductio ad absurdum. But instead of cutting off our creative impulses at this juncture, 
Massumi invites us to delight in the vagueness of the body – to “sense” this infinite 
folding of sensation as “complicating immediacy of self-relation,”145 or what he invites 
us to call an “intensity.” In this sense, Massumi writes that the body becomes, in part, a 
surface of sensory apparatuses in which the intensity felt is experience itself, writing that 
“the conversion of surface distance into intensity is also the conversion of the materiality 
of the body into an event.”146 And this is the same experience the symbolic and our own 
literacies experience: a type of conversion of surface density into intensity, in which 
symbolism is both experienced, in each moment, as an event and as a material signifier – 
something that both is and is constantly affecting and becoming. This then, at least 
theoretically, begins tangentially to refer to the contemporaneity of the virtual (aesthetic) 
and the material aspects of the body – the disjunctive unity of what makes a body both 
move and feel: a unity that is concomitant with the symbolic as such, and that is 
experienced within the field of a particular organisms’ kind of literacy. This intensity that 
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is the body correlates with what I was beginning to explain in the last chapter, in which 
the body is a vibration continuous and contiguous with the rest of the world and the rest 
of the world’s organisms and their literacies experienced in each moment. However, the 
big difference that Massumi includes in his work is a reallocation of the self not as a 
bounded self, situated within a Cartesian dualistic version of reality, but rather as a self -. 
That is to say that the hyphen symbolizes the relation, or the porousness of the body, that 
is always already there, “distributing” as Massumi explains, “subjectivity … along the 
nature-culture continuum.”147  
Self-literate; self-illiterate; self-body; self-emotion, self-scriptural, self-
ascriptural: these are all connections that point towards openings in the spheres of 
applicability that make up positionalities on the horizontal axis of my diagram of literacy 
to other literacies and lived experiences that are vibrating and communicating 
symbolically. And the intensity that is the body can be linked up to codified ways of 
being that have been concretized by the concrescence of our movement on the plane of 
immanence (or the horizontal axis); for example, the body-as-scripturality influences the 
very intensity of the body so that there becomes a different type of aesthetic-symbolic 
intensity that influences how we view the world, just as there’s a different type of 
intensity for the body as self-ascriptural. These types of beings both experience 
competencies within their own types of literacies, and experience illiteracies when 
thinking about their relationship to other types of symbolisms and literacies.   
 Of course, the nature-culture continuum needs further explaining. This continuum 
could be thought of as synonymous with the plane of immanence or my own horizontal 
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axis – that is, the flattening of ontology so that everything in its individuality becomes a 
part of the process of ontogenesis – with the caveat of thinking this plane or field through 
the human mind’s eye: that is, attempting to differentiate between the social and the pre-
social, as humans are, as Aristotle reminds us, social animals by nature. This leads us, 
then, to French philosopher Gilbert Simondon, and his philosophy that there is a 
becoming-social and becoming-culture that is always at the cusp of the concrescence of 
both sociality and culture, always. In this way, sociality and culture are, just like 
concepts, retroactively created, codified and concretized so that we can experience what 
is ostensibly a society or a culture. And this includes, necessarily, the creation and 
reification of our own scripturality as symbolism and as literacy. This, too, is 
retroactively constructed. Underneath, though, there is what Massumi calls a “sociality 
without determinate borders”148 that begins to blur the distinction between the individual 
and the collective. It’s here where we may begin to understand, within this written 
medium that I’m producing, that everything I’m producing is dependent upon this 
underneath, nebulous space, in which feelings are flowing, always in flux, allowing 
certain materialities, like the alphabet, to symbolically rise up. And these thoughts 
provide the theoretical basis for stating that there’s an immanence in between being-
scriptural and being-ascriptural, just as there’s an immanence between being-literate, and 
being-illiterate. Here, then, I transition to the implications of a symbolicity of affect that 
implicates our relationship to the community as such, for it’s exactly this blurring of the 
individual and the collective that the concept of a community evinces, and that gives rise 
to the concept of any type of literacy through time and experience.   
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Relationship to Community 
 
 The ethical consequences of a diffused understanding of literacy and illiteracy 
extend beyond self-other relations to community relations. In the last chapter, I cited 
Diane Davis’s discussion of clinamen, or the “inclination or an inclining from one toward 
the other” due to the fact that, as Jean-Luc Nancy writes, “one cannot make the world 
with simple atoms.”149 Nancy reminds us that the clinamen has to be the “community” of 
the individual, for if it weren’t for the “simple atoms” coalescing and communicating in 
some way, no great “ocean of life” would have a chance of emerging. Davis extends this 
idea, writing that “solidarity is at least the rhetoricity of the affect as such, the 
individual’s irreparable openness to affection/alteration.”150 The ‘rhetoricity of the 
affect,’ in my own thoughts points towards what I stated about ambient rhetoric: a sense 
of affectability persuading and connecting individual actualities. The irreparable 
openness highlights the importance of community as a clinamen of colliding, 
communicating drops of experience that come together to form a demos and an ethos. 
This section explores what happens to community after having re-oriented literacy from 
being-scriptural, which seemingly binds a community together by severing it from the 
more-than-human-world, to literacy as affective symbolism which binds a community 
together by its entanglement with the world. My main interest is to think new ways of 
talking about community that open members up to feeling a sense of connectivity to all 
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things. How do we keep both the intimate connectivity of a community present while 
also, simultaneously, allowing ourselves to feel those outside communities that influence 
our own and appreciate the literacies that flourish there?  
 If we’re to follow Heidegger – a la Davis, but with a nod back to Rickert – he 
reminds us that Dasein is always already a being-with, a mit-da-sein, that necessarily 
means that there is no essential individualistic actuality in the world in the world, but 
rather an always “we” where an “I” is claimed to be – in which an I can be thought of as 
a Mobius strip, weaving itself in and outside of the many spheres of influence it rubs up 
against, coalesces with, and co-creates with. This kind of reconceptualization of being, 
Jean-Luc Nancy writes, means that prior to the emergence of the individual being, there’s 
a being-in-common that demands an inversion of the question of community. Posits 
Nancy, “the question should be the community of being, and not the being of community. 
Or if you prefer: the community of existence, and not the essence of community.”151 
What is it that allows for this community of existence to be, and give birth to, a million 
different individual actualities? Where does the symbolic fit in? Contra Davis, I’d like to 
argue that there’s still here, before the emergence of the “symbol-using being,” 
symbolicity at work in its nascent post-human – or maybe pre-human – manifestation, 
meaning that there’s a way in which to (re)connect the concept of community to better 
‘feel’ the literacies always already allowing our own scripturality-as-literacy to evolve 
and become more intense/complex.  
 In stating that a body finds itself part of the community before it becomes a 
singularity, Nancy writes that the body is a kind of unending exposure in which “to be 
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exposed is to be on the limit where, at the same time, there is both inside and outside, and 
neither inside nor outside” where there is both “division and distribution.”152 This 
concept of there being a division and distribution should remind the reader of the division 
of the symbolic as we become literate-in-scripturality that I mentioned in chapter three, 
and the distribution of the subject along the nature-culture continuum that I referenced in 
the last sub-section of this chapter. As for the argument that the body is the site of 
exposure, this type of observation corroborates exactly what Massumi was arguing for in 
his work when he expanded on the disjunctive-aspect of the body, in which there is, 
concurrently, both a past-ness and a present-ness to the body, just as there is a community 
and a singularity whose coalescing at the site of the body creates an ectopia that allows 
for there to be what Whitehead will call the interstices of life, in which the creative, 
aesthetic flow of life can move and create new-ness – both for the body and for the 
community. This ectopia that is the body makes it so that the subject who has a body can 
and does recursively reflect on the impossibility of capturing the body as a concept 
without that concept always branching out infinitely to connect to and weave itself 
through interactions, emotions, people – in sum, exterior influences, effectively creating 
communities by way of these connections. This means that the body becomes to the 
individual an exposure of finitude – that is, the porous boundary which separates what is 
effectively the “inside” from the “outside” – and this finiteness that is represented to the 
individual “exists as communication” with everything outside of it, which is the 
necessary move we’ve been making for the past two chapters, by tying together 
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ontegenesis and the symbolic – effectively stating that literacies always already exist as 
organisms exist and move, using and reacting to – as they must – the symbolic.  
 Considering the question of what a community is, Nancy writes we “must expose 
ourselves to what has gone unheard in the community”153 instead of trying to find a 
collective identity. Rather than rely on the representative powers of language and 
ideology to organize and demarcate what should and shouldn’t be said or done in the 
community, one should accept the theoretical baselessness of community, which then 
places a burden on everyone to appreciate community as a “gift to be renewed and 
communicated”154 If a community is to persist, a central tenet of what is communicated is 
the very feeling of necessity to keep communication itself always open always toward the 
“Other(s).” Nancy calls this kind of “keeping open” an “intensity of death,” but in regard 
to a diffused sense of literacy, we can think of it as an intensity of affective symbolism 
that demands to be felt. Understanding that the body – as it moves and speaks and 
interacts with Others – is concomitant with the symbolic and that all bodies create 
literacies through their feeling and movement allows us to get past an anthropocentric, 
scriptural framing of community. As Whitehead writes, “symbolism is inherent in the 
very texture of human life”155 and so we should broaden the scope of how we think 
literacy shaping the experience of community. By embedding a Whiteheadian sense of 
literacy into Nancy’s discussion of community, I’m interested in trying to conceive of 
new ways to write and read, both with and toward communities beyond those defined by 
being-scriptural.  
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 Whitehead continues, “communities with geographical unity constitute the 
primary type of communities which we find in the world” and “societies of the higher 
animals, of insects, of molecules, all possess geographical unity,” which “dispel[s] the 
notion that social life is a peculiarity of the higher organisms.”156 The ethical 
consequences of opening the understanding of community is to “foster[s] this diffused 
feeling of the common possession of a treasure infinitely precious.”157 This treasure, 
Whitehead will explain, is that which keeps social systems together: the “instinctive 
emotions clustered around habits and prejudices.”158 The ability to feel the community 
and the Other(s) while also “feeling” ourselves – in sum, literacies as I have defined 
them. Symbolic expression preserves society in that it accomplishes the feat of “adding 
emotion to instinct, and secondly affords a foothold for reason by its delineation of the 
particular instinct which it expresses.”159 Prior to reason and epistemology there’s the 
symbolic and the aesthetic and the literacies that attend them, which are embedded in 
communities writ large, even before the community begins forming itself. And every 
aspect of the community, every individual entity that is part of the whole environment, 
has an important role to play in everything both working properly (surviving and 
persisting) and creatively unfolding into novelty. Part of the novelty involves creating 
openings within already formed literacies on the one hand, and forming new literacies all 
together on the other. As Whitehead writes, and he’s worth quoting at length here: 
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the world is a community of organisms; these organisms in the mass determine 
the environmental influence on any one of them; there can only be a persistent 
community of persistent organisms when the environmental influence in the shape 
of instinct is favorable to the survival of individuals. Thus the community as an 
environment is responsible for the survival of the separate individuals which 
compose it; and these separate individuals are responsible for their contributions 
to the environment.160 
 
In sum, what a symbolic of affect begins to show us is how there is no separating 
the symbolic from the aesthetic, both of which are always firing as reality continuously 
unfurls in new organizations of complexity and splendor, and what follows from this 
ubiquitous symbolism are literacies that contain within them aesthetic instincts inherent 
within diverse entities. These literacies are responsible to and for the environment in 
which they persist, meaning that it’s necessary to re-orient our own literacy-as-
scripturality toward communicating with the more-than-human-world, our largest 
community.  
 Having situated ourselves as always open to unfinished community building, the 
only way to foster new ways of creating communities – new “lines of flight” within our 
current communal-assemblage, Deleuze and Guattari would say – is to let go of our 
ultimate reverence for codified symbol-systems and work to find the openings where we 
can better “feel” that which allows our codes to exist in the first place. We need to open 
ourselves, as a community, to a fearlessness of constant, never-ending revision – always 
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working collaboratively to push past the limits of propriety and to explore the vagueness 
of the emotional that gives rise to the material literacies: our own texts and scripts and 
books. In this sense, being-ascriptural and illiteracy within other kinds of literacies gain a 
new-found importance in the scriptural communities of the present day. Rather than 
literacy-as-scripturality holding a position of power and prestige – understood as closer to 
a humanistic “truth” than ascripturality – we can think of illiteracy as a type of symbolic 
lived-experience that always informs but never envelops our own, literate-sphere of 
scripturality. In this way, there are emotions that have yet to be captured in our 
community of literacy that the other literate-spheres may hold. Perhaps we’ve felt them, 
but don’t have the words. I don’t have the words here, either. My only hope is that such a 
re-thinking of community helps us collectively open wider the pores that allow us all to 
feel that which escapes our scriptural reasoning; together, peeling back layers until we 
see and feel more of what’s underneath the surface that shapes and nourishes our own 
literacy. There needs to be a fearlessness of exploration within the world of scripturality, 
in which those who are scripturally literate test the boundaries and communicate back to 
their community of scribes where the walls of their own literacy are weakest – where 
they feel other forms of literacy with their attendant symbolisms. To think of community 
as a collective attempt at always being more aesthetically inclusive, with a changing and 
dynamic symbolism – that is my hope.  
 
Literacy as Landscape: Writing Outward 
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 At the beginning of her work, Finitude’s Clamor; Or, Notes toward a 
Communitarian Literacy, Diane Davis recounts an entry made in Gustave Flaubert’s 
published collected letters – this specific letter detailing his time exploring the Orient. 
While on his trip, Flaubert had come across the name THOMPSON, etched in large, 
ostentatious letters across a column erected by Pompey. Incredulously, Flaubert has 
written that “there’s no way to see the column without seeing the name ‘Thompson’ and 
consequently without thinking of Thompson.” Having introduced this experience, Davis 
then pivots to Avital Ronell – who also has written about this specific Flaubert passage: 
“unless one is a complete jerk, one leaves this earth insecure over one’s name: one 
remains stupid about its destination. But Thompson, his name arrived.”161 
 As I’ve been tracing throughout this chapter and the last, a necessary tension 
exists between the vagueness of the aesthetic experience of the symbolic, and the 
materialization of the symbolic itself. Whitehead wrote that “the art of free society 
consists first in the maintenance of the symbolic code,”162 but more importantly, in light 
of Nancy’s concept of community as perpetually incomplete, free society needs to be 
fearless in revising such a code so that it may continue to be free. It can be quite easy to 
lose oneself completely on one side or the other of this tension between maintenance and 
revision – between the aesthetic and the epistemic, and in this case, between writing to 
announce oneself, and writing so as to open oneself up and connect and feel.  
In her work, Davis correlates the self-assurance of the graffiti “Thompson” with 
the myth of self-conscious presence that seems to be taught to composition students. It is 
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possible to present oneself, through writing, to those reading; it is possible to be equal to 
one’s signature and to be confident that there’s an assurance of individuality in such a 
presentation. This kind of assurance through writing encourages “students to trace and 
retrace what Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus call their molar lines, lines of 
rigid segmentarity associated with a so-called personal history, at the expense of their 
molecular and/or flight lines.”163 Massumi warned of organizing the socio-cultural 
environment as a grid because it traps us in an amalgam of either/or binaries. His warning 
resonates with what Davis is arguing. She too recognizes the tight and very sanitized 
space that scriptural writing has been pushed into: a ‘white wall/black hole system’ that 
proffers the myth of self-presence, and though it allows one to speak from and for 
particular positions, it does so at too great a cost, promoting a kind of political/social 
economy at the expense of the experience of community.”164  
 As Ranciere explains to us in his work The Politics of Aesthetics, when one thinks 
of art, they think of it entirely – or mostly entirely – divorced from the “real,” from the 
empirical, in which “life” happens. But, as he writes, “the aesthetic revolution rearranges 
the rules of the game by making two things independent: the blurring of the borders 
between the logic of facts and the logic of fiction and the new mode of rationality that 
characterizes the science of history.”165 In other words, the way in which stories and 
poetry had been told and created via creativity and aesthetic inspiration began to diffuse 
outward into the material world, where the romantic age took hold and “plunged 
language into the materiality of the traits by which the historical and social world 
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becomes visible to itself.”166 While this type of blurring was and could be confusing for 
the modernist, Ranciere’s description reminds us of the prescience of the Romantic age in 
regards to its resonance with a post-structuralism type of thought about the way the world 
is organized and created, or always be-coming. In my opinion, this type of understanding 
of signs corroborates my own argument for the importance of an acceptance of a 
symbolic of affect, for as Ranciere explains, signs and symbols already are – and always 
have been – affective. He writes, “This literary arrangement of signs… is the association 
between… the accelerations or decelerations of language, its shuffling of images or 
sudden changes of tone, all its differences of potential between insignificant and the 
overly significant… and on the other hand, the modalities of a trip through the landscape 
of significant traits deposited in the topography of spaces, the physiology of social 
circles, the silent expression of bodies.”167 This description of the signs that are always in 
use, and that have yet to be used, shows that underneath the hermeneutical interpretation 
of the social and historical world, there’s always the aesthetic at play, giving rise to 
literacies that accelerate and decelerate at various speeds, and which influence the 
topography of the spaces we find ourselves in – sometimes negatively.  
 In further exploring the aesthetic play underneath the nature-culture continuum – 
in a nod back to Massumi – Ranciere writes that politics and aesthetics have material 
effects in the way we perceive and retroactively organize our individual and collective 
reality. Ranciere is worth quoting at length, here, when he writes that political statements 
(rhetoric) and literary locutions (literacy-as-scripturality):  
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define models of speech or action, but also regimes of sensible intensity. They 
draft maps of the visible, trajectories between the visible and the sayable, 
relationships between modes of being, modes of saying, and modes of doing and 
making. They define variation of sensible intensities, perceptions, and the abilities 
of bodies. They thereby take hold of unspecified groups of people, they widen 
gaps, open up space for deviations, modify the speeds, the trajectories, and the 
ways in which groups of people adhere to a condition, react to situations, 
recognize their images.168 
 
These gaps that are opened up by literarity are what allow the human to be a political 
animal, insofar as the human – if we think back to Whitehead – can transcend her 
instinctual drives and be overtaken by the symbolic of affect – effectively becoming 
quasi-bodies, or Massumi’s self- that introduces lines of flight within the current 
assemblages of society. And, when these quasi-bodies, or scriptural-bodies – for our own 
purposes – diffuse outward they “cause modifications in the sensory perception of what is 
common to the community, in the relationship between what is common to language and 
the sensible distribution of spaces and occupations.”169 Indeed, this sentiment is exactly 
the importance, in my argument, for a literacy of landscape – an understanding of the 
importance of writing outward to expose oneself to the environment and the Other, 
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effectively attempting to infuse the more-than-human-world back into literacy-as-
scripturality.   
 As Deleuze and Guattari write in their works – and as a potentially appropriate 
neologisms for our purposes in understanding how to reconceive of the “writer” or the 
“literate” – an individual is like a haecceity which consists “entirely of relations of 
movement and rest between molecules or particles, capacities to affect and to be 
affected.”170 And when this individual writes, she traces the fault-lines of these 
affectations, opening herself up to the spaces and individuals that move her and sway her 
in each instance. She is written while writing. And yet, interpretive, hermeneutical 
understandings of literacy bar one from this feeling of interconnectedness that is 
necessary for literacy-as-scripturality to emerge in the first place. Of course the affect is 
still there, buried beneath the retroactively erected ideologies of humanism and 
epistemology, but the gap in which to feel it is layered-over – shrunk. A communitarian 
literacy, on the other hand, “obeys the sole necessity of exposing the limit: not the limit 
of communication, but the limit upon which communication takes place.”171 Such a 
communitarian-literacy would teach writers to, as Derrida says, “write texts that don’t 
return, that take off on their own, like a child that starts talking and goes on talking by 
itself.”172  Our task, then, of re-establishing this communitarian, post-humanist, 
ecological literacy would be to, as David Abram encourages, “release the budded, earthly 
intelligence of our words, freeing them to respond to the speech of the things themselves 
– to the green uttering-forth of leaves from the spring branches. [We must] spin stories 
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that have the rhythm and lilt of the local sound-scape, tales for the tongue, tales that want 
to be told again, and again, sliding off the digital screen and slipping off the lettered page 
to inhabit these coastal forests, these desert canyons, those whispering grasslands and 
valleys and swamps.”173 This kind of re-orientation for scripturality would, I hope, over 
time enact a paradigm shift within our current thoughts about literacy, allowing for a 
more inclusive, creative, feeling-orientated practice (and teaching) of reading and 
writing.  
 This kind of turn in literacy studies won’t be easy, and much of what I’ve outlined 
in these past few pages is strictly theory. What then of a move towards proliferating this 
type of communitarian literacy? An acceptance of literacy and illiteracy not as a 
bifurcation, but as an immanence that when understood aesthetically opens us up to 
different molecular lines of material and conceptual movement? In a word, different 
literacies? It’s my belief that such a paradigm shift needs to start and spread out from our 
own pedagogical methods – especially our pedagogy surrounding literacy studies. A 
move towards a new, re-conceptualized type of pedagogy is the subject of my next, and 
final, chapter. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
TURN TOWARDS A NEW PEDAGOGY 
 
It’s been the work of this thesis to problematize the bifurcation of literacy and 
illiteracy as concepts inherently separated, and to call into question literacy understood as 
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an autonomous skill-set situated squarely within the realm of the epistemic, and illiteracy 
as the lack of that skill-set. With these goals in mind, I began chapter two with a detailed, 
historical account of the emergence of literacy as a concept. By following this emergence 
of reading and writing through time, I noted the concepts that were introduced as reading 
and writing became diffuse – especially noting how the emergence of a scriptural literacy 
seemed to introduce a separation of the individual from the more-than-human-world. It 
was also in chapter two that I introduced a new way of thinking about literacy and 
illiteracy: not as epistemological skill-sets, but rather as ways of being that are multiple 
and immanent to each other, horizontally situated on an axis of flat ontology.  In chapter 
three, I put forth new concepts to replace our colloquial definitions of literacy and 
illiteracy: substituting literacy for scripturality, and illiteracy for ascripturality. These new 
‘modes of being’ were introduced to set up the evidence that there’s an immanence 
between major literacies, and within literacies, meaning that every type of literacy is 
never a skill-set, but always a way of being continuous with its environment, with 
systems of power, and with other kinds of literacies. In chapters four, I worked to explore 
the aesthetic immanence between the organization of literacy diffused on a horizontal 
axis and argued for a new way in which to relate to the symbolic, namely as a symbolic 
of affect. Then, in chapter five, I pivoted to extrapolate the influences this new way of 
relating to the symbolic may have on important conceptual and ethical relationships we 
have as human beings, specifically relating to nature, to the body-as-self and the body-as-
other, and to community. Finally, in this chapter, I will make a hard turn into thinking 
about different ways of organizing a practical pedagogical methodology for literacy, 
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taking into consideration the theoretical arguments I’ve been making for the past five 
chapters.  
At the beginning of his work, The Ethnography of Literacy, John Szwed writes 
that, “assumptions are made in educational institutions about the literacy needs of 
individual students which seem not to be born out by the students’ day-to-day lives. And 
it is this relationship between school and the outside world that I think must be observed, 
studied and highlighted.”174 At its heart, this thesis has been focused on working to 
excavate how best to re-orient literacy studies and the rhetoric surrounding literacy 
studies so as to subvert the dominant ideology surrounding the value of literacy that the 
major pedagogical methodologies and institutions reify – (or perhaps, the value of 
accumulating capital that arguably leads from one becoming-literate). Indeed, one can 
argue for the perversion of the school system as already influenced by the demand for a 
system of cultural capital and currency that inevitably effects the way the major 
discourses – and motivations – surrounding literacy are communicated and taught. As 
Linda Brodkey writes:  
 
Take tests for grades, exchange the grade for credentials, use the credentials to 
launch a career, measure by the number of promotions and the size of the 
paychecks and the amount of the stock. Writing is only incidental in this cycle. It 
is incidental because the cycle deflates the value of the intellectual work of 
practices like writing in order to artificially inflate the value of ritual performance 
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(achievement tests, reading scores) that can be calculated and minted as cultural 
currency.175 
 
 The use of the word “ritualistic” is a nod towards the way in which ideologies (in 
this case the capitalistic ideology) have provided the illusion of autonomous agency 
situated within an institutional apparatus very much like Brian Massumi’s grid that I 
mentioned in chapter three, in addition to a proffering of the myth that literacy is an 
autonomous skill-set, independent of the ideological grid, that can be taught to those 
willing to learn. Such an anthropocentric centering of agency and literacy creates the 
sense of choice for the agent, providing a normalized, dichotomous understanding of 
right and wrong, left and right, black and white, literacy and illiteracy, while continuing 
to erect systemic assemblages and institutions of oppression, power, and privilege, all of 
which contributes to the marginalization of bodies, movements and radical thought. A 
different, more liberatory pedagogical model is necessary, then – one that incorporates a 
different way of thinking about literacy that doesn’t fetishize being-literate as an 
autonomous skill-set but rather appreciates literacy and illiteracy as ways of being that 
allow rather than obstruct communication with other ways of being. This, I submit, is the 
pedagogical goal I have in mind in this chapter: attempting to lay the down the first steps 
to constructing an emancipatory pedagogical methodology that incorporates a re-
orientated relationship to the symbolic and to literacy and illiteracy as ways of being, 
rather than skills.  
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To begin, if you ask most of the western world where they learned to read – really 
learned to read and write and to interact in the dominant language of their socio-
economic milieu, the answer most of the time will be school. The next question we have 
to ask, then, in peeling back the layers of how to allow for change in thinking about and 
teaching literacy is: what is school? I realize that’s a large question, and how I orient my 
argument in relation to this question will leave much out, but I hope, at the end, it will 
make sense that those bits of the argument necessarily need to be left out so that dynamic 
movements of pedagogy may have some room to breathe. To return to the question of 
what a school is, we necessarily need to think about what it is that constitutes a school: 
both theoretically as the superstructure, and materially, as the structure itself. Foucault is 
especially helpful for these kinds of genealogical demarcations. As Deleuze writes in his 
work on Foucault, (and this isn’t specifically referenced to institutions of pedagogy alone, 
necessarily, but can be assumed to include them): “[in Foucault’s work] we have 
encountered three dimensions: the relations which have been formed or formalized along 
certain strata (Knowledge); the relations between forces to be found at the level of the 
diagram (Power); and the relation with the outside, that absolute relation with the 
outside… which is also a non-relation (Thought).”176 
In beginning to dismantle the parts of the school that necessarily need to be re-
thought for the teaching of literacy to undergo an aesthetic shift, we can assume that in 
the creation of an assemblage of the school, or the pedagogic site itself, these three 
dimensions: knowledge, power, and thought, all go into the mix in (sometimes) unequal 
distributions. What makes the site of the pedagogic so fascinating is the recursivity of its 
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ontological nature. The fact that it is both an assemblage constructed by already 
concretized concepts that we classify as knowledge and that it inevitably engages in the 
very concrescence of the creative advancement of thought; it allows for the coming 
together of various energies and vibrations and intensities that, when coalesced, create 
raptures that, at best, enact a paradigm shift on a microcosmic level in each of the 
students, encouraging them to think beyond the page and beyond the textbook, and at 
worst, are captured and appropriated by the power-system that allows for the school-
building itself to be built, and for the curriculum to be taught.  
This is to say that, like all things operating with the predominant scriptural 
economy, pedagogy relies on discursive parameters that insinuates a “this, not-that” 
mentality. Every concept and its signified must have “its ontological and epistemological 
parameters”177 in order to establish itself within discourse and to be built, discussed, or 
critiqued. And so it is with school and those who make up the staff of a school: the 
teachers, principles, administrators, superintendents, etc. Each position – each slot on the 
grid – comes with a job description and a discourse that informs who fills the position 
and how. Such a placement, in turn, informs how we think about and talk about “clever 
children” or “talented students” or “success stories.” The power flows unilaterally, and in 
its wake is how the rest of the world, and especially the pedagogical assemblage, finds 
itself structured. In our case, with the world largely organized by global capital, the 
power-flow is dominated by production and consumption. This theoretical observation 
corroborates Brodkey’s above comment about the normalization of writing as incidental 
and only functional amidst the machinery of a capitalistic model of reality.  
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 There’s a necessary politico-ethical component inherent with the pedagogical 
system being discussed here, in which the pedagogical is understood as an act of 
exposure that necessarily leaves both the “teacher” and the “student” fragmented. 
Inevitably, as Nancy writes, all communication, whether conscious of it or not, “obeys 
the sole necessity of exposing the limit: not the limit of communication, but the limit 
upon which communication takes place.”178 In pedagogical moments of inspiration and 
communication and affect, experiences occur which exceed the institutionality of the 
context itself to create moments where, as Butler writes, “we ask ourselves what it might 
mean to continue in dialogue where no common ground can be assumed, where one is, as 
it were, at the limits of what one knows yet still under the demand to offer, and receive 
acknowledgement: to someone else who is there to be addressed and whose address is 
there to be received.”179 Arguably, moments like these happen all the time in the 
classroom, but their creativity and dynamism are swept aside by a reflexive stance taken 
by the teacher who has been conditioned to think and teach in a certain “grid-like” way – 
the necessary next question must be one that takes up the mantle of the unknown by 
asking “Who” and “How”? That is to say, “who are you” and the question of “how” to 
learn. I take up this question of “how” to learn by considering orientations towards 
pedagogy that radical thinkers have taken.  
 In his work, “Pedagogy of the Event,” Dennis Atkinson asks this very question: 
“how can we understand the idea of risk taking? Is it possible to provide a theoretical 
basis upon which to enhance our understanding of this concept that takes us beyond the 
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prosaic idea of ‘taking a chance’ [in pedagogical moments] and thereby provide 
pedagogy with a more substantive theoretical underpinning of this concept?”180 In a 
gesture toward Alain Badiou, Atkinson argues that “taking a chance” necessarily needs to 
involve movements toward a “new or changed ontological state” that takes into 
consideration the always already fluid state of being. In Massumi’s terms, this is the 
ontogenesis of our communicative concepts and our moments of communication with 
each-other. This kind of pedagogy Atkinson wants to call a pedagogy of the event, where 
the event understood is understood as that which exceeds the situational context, but that 
nevertheless affects and effects the situation itself so as to allow for novelty to occur. 
This kind of pedagogy would be focused on epistemic limits or, in a Derridean sense, 
where our knowledge and concepts break down and fall in on themselves. A pedagogy of 
the event would focus on those moments of break down, moving the class as a 
collaborative collective forward, unafraid and curious, toward a continuous state of 
becoming. This aligns with what Davis describes as an emancipatory “being-with.” I 
envision this pedagogical stance as an exploratory, seminar-style organization, where 
literacies are discussed as various, lived-ways-of-being, and where reading and writing 
are practiced as ways in which to communicate not within but past the limits of a body 
and system of thought. The practice would be to strive to feel connections between 
different literacies, especially ascriptural ones, that are currently left to the dark side of 
“illiteracy.”   
 With his “pedagogy of the event,” Atkinson posits a method of teaching which 
always breaks up our frameworks of understanding and looks for “gaps in the 
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symbolic”181 that appear when our epistemological concepts fail under an influx of un-
representable experience needing to be symbolized. It is necessary to move past 
Atkinson, however, because he situates the symbolic firmly on the side of epistemology – 
effectively making the dichotomy between ontology and the symbolic stronger. Keeping 
the symbolic firmly tethered to the ontogenesis of the body, I’d like to connect the 
Badiouian concept of the event where “truth” is what bursts open and out of the event, 
with Whitehead’s concept of feeling. Badiou writes, “education (save its oppressive or 
perverted expressions) has never meant anything but this: to arrange the forms of 
knowledge in such a way that some truth may come to pierce a hole in them.”182 Indeed, 
in order to move towards a new pedagogy, a re-orientation of literacy and illiteracy will 
necessarily have to take into account the emancipatory characteristic of learning. To be 
successful, a new pedagogy will have to sense what to break-down and how to open itself 
up. In our thinking about literacy, too, it was necessary to break the concept of literacy-
in-school away from the perverted expression of literacy-as-scripturality and pedagogy-
as-currency that’s endemic to institutionalized education.  
As Laura Rosenberg writes in her work, Rewriting Ideologies of Literacy, “what 
people desire in their education is not usually the actual literacy of school (unless you are 
an educator), but the currency assigned to school literacy.”183 The currency assigned to 
literacy, I would argue, is the film – like a layer of dust – that’s powdered the concept of 
literacy since its inception as the way in which to communicate. Scriptural literacy is the 
ultimate conveyance of an individual amidst other individuals. It’s necessary to separate 
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the metaphorical – and literal – currency of literacy from the value of literacy, for it’s the 
value that gets at the importance of the feeling of literacy. Literacy is not a truth, nor is 
the accumulation of currency the ultimate goal. Rather, by stripping away the currency of 
literacy it is possible to understand the need to write outwards, to communicate outwards, 
to teach outwards: always with an eye towards the continual emergence of both the 
community and the student-teacher simultaneously.  
 This kind of pedagogy-as-becoming seems to resonate most with the work of 
Jacques Ranciere, Paulo Freire, and Ivan Illich: three scholars with whom I’ll be pulling 
from as I write my way towards filling out a new kind of pedagogy. Resituating how 
pedagogy should be organized also informs how I believe literacy should be taught, in 
addition to how illiteracy should be thought about. As Freire writes about in his work, 
Pedagogy of the Oppressed, “the very structure of their [the oppressed] thought has been 
conditioned by the contradictions of the concrete, existential situation by which they were 
shaped. Their ideal is to be men [or women]; but for them, to be men [or women] is to be 
oppressors.”184 The way in which educational systems are generally organized, and the 
power-dynamics that make it so, monopolize thought and ideology, creating what is 
effectively a brain-washed preliterate intent on “graduating” into the petit-bourgeoisie by 
engaging in similar methods of oppression and a mind-set that applauds the “individual” 
versus the “community.” This kind of thinking, I would argue, also stems from the false 
belief that scriptural literacy is a “True” way of being; that literacy is a fundamental way 
of being that is “Right” and “Individually” accessed, rather than being connected to and 
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necessary for hegemonic, oppressive power-systems that organize the very process of 
becoming literate in the first place.  
 However, the paradox that presents itself when one begins to critique the systems 
in place is exactly this: “how can the oppressed, as divided, unauthentic beings, 
participate in developing the pedagogy of their liberation?”185 Freire responds by pointing 
towards the indeterminate space that always needs to be fitted in between a dichotomy: 
the interstice through which one discovers other ways of being and which never exhausts 
its potentiality. This kind of “middle-way,” a searching and striving ethos, “is born in the 
labor which brings into the world this new being: no longer oppressor, no longer 
oppressed, but human in the process of achieving freedom.”186 What it is that makes us 
human is exactly this idea of continuous transformation: engaging with the world and 
opening ourselves up to change and to being changed, to affect and to being affected 
endlessly. 
 Freire says as much when he tackles the paradox of objective transformation and 
subjective immobility. He is worth quoting in full:  
“the denial of objectivity in analysis or action, resulting in a subjectivism which 
leads to solipsistic positions, denies itself by denying objective reality. Neither 
objectivism nor subjectivism, nor yet psychologism is propounded here, but rather 
subjectivity and objectivity in constant dialectical relationship.187  
The only change I’d make is to note that the relationship between subjectivity and 
objectivity isn’t dialectical so much as it is immanent – always in tension and yet 
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entwined like a Mobius strip, where the tension between the two is the indeterminate 
interstice where novelty emerges. Oppositions are generative of novelty, and the 
opposition that I’ve been tracing throughout this thesis is the one between the individual 
body and the community as established by scriptural literacy. My goal has been to ask 
how we may take on a new way of thinking and feeling about the symbolic so as to 
reorient our relationships to individuality, community, and as a result, pedagogy.  
As Freire reminds us, “World and human beings do not exist apart from each 
other, they exist in constant interaction.”188 But again, this interaction is more of a 
constant flux immanent to ontology. The fact that potentiality in each actuality is never 
exhausted but keeps replenishing itself, favors the sort of pedagogy I am advocating for. 
As Nathan Stormer writes in his work, “Everything Moves, Even When It Doesn’t,” an 
event’s “actuality is flickering, modal, but the capacity for such events endures, if only as 
an intuition of loss and arrival that cakes every instant like a layer of dust.”189 This 
means, then, that if we’re to connect back to Atkinson and Badiou, that a pedagogy-of-
the-event would necessarily always be moving – and the various potentialities of the 
pedagogy would, in each moment, be opening and closing. In this sense, kairotic 
moments of pedagogy become all the more important. How does a teacher-student, or a 
student-teacher interact and react to an event that exceeds the contextual situation they 
find themselves in? To cultivate a sensitivity to these moments would then become the 
actual goal of a pedagogy-of-the-event. Such a sensitivity would necessarily be 
understood as the way in which one is aesthetically responsive to their environment and 
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the many different actualities that make up that environment. This pedagogy would 
present a different way of teaching literacy in the concrete, and teaching about literacy in 
the abstract. That is to suggest that, within the space of the class itself, a reiteration of the 
necessity to overflow the context of both the class and the body – connecting to the 
excess that allows there to be any structure – should more seriously influence the way 
pedagogy itself is practiced and organized.  
 This kind of pedagogy would not be a deposit of information into students. 
Rather, this kind of pedagogy of literacy, and pedagogy in general, would demand a 
critical analysis of the environment and situation one found themselves in, in each 
moment – a real kind of attunement that would be aesthetic and that would demand a 
response. As Freire writes, 
there would be no human action if there were no objective reality, no world to be 
the ‘not I’ … just as there would be no human action if humankind were not a 
‘project,’ if he or she were not able to transcend himself or herself, if one were not 
able to perceive reality and understand it in order to transform it.190  
The wording that Freire uses deviates ever so slightly from my own metaphysical 
understanding of being and becoming, but the gist of what he’s getting at, I can get 
behind. First of all, the objective reality he posits shouldn’t be understood as a sort of 
Newtonian-absolute-objective-space, but rather as that which is outside of the body, but 
also continuous with the body, allowing the body to move in and through time-space. 
Furthermore, Freire’s use of “understand” seems to fall on the side of an idealism that 
puts the human intellect outside of the environment it finds itself in – an extrapolation 
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that I’ve argued against in chapter four of this thesis. That being said, positing that the 
body-mind of the human is embedded in the “rest of nature” doesn’t mean that there isn’t, 
situated within the human, a potentiality to affect the environment and create change. 
Quite the contrary; all things, in each moment, have the potentiality for change, and do, 
consistently, create new-ness. This is all to say that with a few quick changes, Freire still 
very much aligns with my argument. And anyway, the part that I’m specifically 
interested in using is when he writes that humanity is always a project, always working to 
transcend itself through reality. The reason behind my interest in this specific piece of 
Freire’s statement is due to the fact that it is almost verbatim what Ranciere will argue for 
with his concept of universal teaching: a pedagogical method that, in Ranciere’s 
philosophy, provides the model for intellectual emancipation.  
 Ranciere is also interested in working in between the potentiality and actuality of 
things: what Freire calls the dialectical movement in between subjectivity and objectivity, 
but that is always necessarily the interstice in and through which, as Whitehead will say, 
life happens. As Ranciere writes, 
One must learn near those who have worked in the gap between feeling and 
expression, between the silent language of emotion and the arbitrariness of the 
spoken tongue, near those who have tried to give voice to the silent dialogue the 
soul has with itself, who have gambled all their credibility on the bet of the 
similarity of minds.191  
In situating the gap or the interstice between feeling and expression instead of Freire’s 
subjectivity and objectivity, Ranceire is echoing the importance of the aesthetic regarding 
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political and pedagogical matters. And to be sure, Ranciere’s situating of “the gap” 
doesn’t necessarily exclude Freire’s. This gap is immanent – a virtual realm of creative 
potential that fosters kairotic moments to create novelty.  
In order for us to better understand what Ranciere means when he uses the 
concept, “universal teaching,” Joshua Ewalt, in his work “Rhetoric, Poetics, and Jacques 
Ranciere’s The Ignorant Schoolmaster” provides us with an easy-to-follow outline. Ewalt 
writes,  
the logic of universal teaching is as follows. From the start of life, all humans 
learn through observation and repetition, exemplified first by the act of acquiring 
language and using that language to communicate. A child first learns a word and 
“relates everything else to it” in order to eventually more skillfully navigate the 
material exteriority of language.192  
Ranciere, following the pedagogy of teacher Joseph Jacotot – who found that he could 
teach something he didn’t know anything about to students who also didn’t know 
anything about the subject – posits that there is an intellectual equivalence between all 
(human) beings, and that the way in which to teach, then, is to leverage material things so 
as to create a “bridge of communication between two minds” that allows an emancipatory 
relationship to form in that both the “student” and the “teacher” don’t necessarily feel 
subordinated to the other.  Instead, both interact and respond to each other via a material 
medium that they both can sense and feel in equally “intelligent” ways – that is, in their 
own types of literacies.  
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 This type of pedagogy doesn’t necessarily need to be focused on any one kind of 
topic, but is rather more interested in, as Ranciere writes, “rais[ing] up those who believe 
themselves inferior in intelligences, to make them leave the swamp where they are 
stagnating – not the swamp of ignorance, but the swamp of self-contempt, of contempt in 
and of itself for the reasonable creature. It is to make emancipated and emancipating men 
[and women].”193 The goal of universal teaching is to create more points of emancipation 
within the society via people who are aware of the normalizing oppression of hegemonic 
systems of power, but that who are also aware of the illusory inequality of inherent ability 
– intellectual or otherwise. These people work to proliferate the emancipatory quality of a 
radical pedagogy like the one Jacotot believed in by leveraging materiality itself, even the 
materiality of language or the written word as they manifest within literacy-as-
scripturality. 
 This is how I believe literacy-as-scripturality should be taught: not as a currency 
that needs to be collected and then used for personal gain, but as a valuable, material, 
symbolic intensification of the body that allows for a different way of relating to 
ourselves and others, and that can be used to show that all others are just as capable, just 
as intelligent, just as connected to everything and everyone, as anyone else, and that there 
are ways in which to explore each kind of literacy, pushing the boundaries, so as to feel 
other kinds of literacies. As Ranciere writes, “we can never say [that is, we can never 
empirically prove] all intelligence is equal… But our problem isn’t proving that all 
intelligence is equal. It’s seeing what can be done under that supposition.”194 And 
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assuming that illiteracy, in teaching literacy, is just as important and primordial to 
ontogenesis as literacy – that is to say, the symbolic – then those who are illiterate within 
a scriptural economy have entirely different ways of relating to the world and to the 
language of scripturality that they are “entering” into. These other relations to the world 
necessarily afford new ways of thinking, speaking, and becoming for them, including the 
ways in which they become scripturally “literate” more generally. These new ways of 
thinking, speaking, and becoming allow us to introduce new potentialities already 
“flowing” through the scriptural economy. As a result, one is neither “completely 
literate” nor “completely illiterate” within certain symbolisms, but rather always both at 
the same time – just as one is both an actualization and a potentiality at each moment. 
And as more emancipated individuals feel themselves becoming scriptural, literacy-as-
scripturality itself can become a site for emancipation from the inside – opening itself up 
and out, rather than retreating inward to the myth of the individual, self-possessed 
literate, and the myth that there being is only one type of anthropocentric literacy, that of 
scripturality. It follows that if we’re to teach literacy more accurately, then, it will have to 
be with a nod towards the immanence of illiteracy to literacy, rather than teaching 
literacy as if it’s a threshold one crosses. We must remember, as Ranciere writes, that “all 
men [and women] hold in common the ability to feel pleasure and pain.”195 Which is to 
say that all beings hold in common the ability to feel, which necessarily dismantles the 
dichotomy of inside-outside, individuality-community, literacy-illiteracy, and shows that 
there is no ultimate static way of being, so much as a constant becoming that one can 
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only ever feel, react to, and keep feeling, all the while constructing symbolisms in the 
wake of their movement.  
 After all that I have said, however, I am not arguing that literacy is a bad thing or 
that we should valorize being-ascriptural over being scriptural. Obviously, there are 
incredible advancements made in every intellectual field due to the fact that words, ideas 
and numbers can be written down and persist through time. Rather, what I am calling for 
in regard to pedagogy aligns with how Ewalt brings out the difference between “rhetoric” 
as Ranciere understands it, and poetics. Admittedly, Ranciere doesn’t have a high opinion 
of rhetoric. He writes:  
 
Poetic language that knows itself as such doesn’t contradict reason. On the 
contrary, it reminds each speaking subject not to take the narrative of his mind’s 
adventures for the voice of truth. Every speaking subject is the poet of himself 
and of things. Perversion is produced when the poem is given as something other 
than a poem, when it wants to be imposed as truth, when it wants to force action. 
Rhetoric is perverted poetry.196 
 
If it seems like there’s a Nietzschean tint to this statement, that’s a good thing. One could 
say that we have forgotten that we’ve “made” up what Ranciere here calls rhetoric, or 
what I would call scripturality – that these ways of communicating aren’t, in fact, True. 
And yet, they’re still necessary – literacy and rhetoric, that is. As Ranciere writes, there 
couldn’t be a society of pure poets. Rather, the best we can do is teach rhetoric so that the 
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rhetors never forget that they are poets, just as we can teach scripturality, so that those 
literate in scripturality never forget that they are also, and will always be to some degree, 
illiterate.  
 In a move towards accepting the inherent “violence” or “perversion” of rhetoric as 
necessary, but also potentially conducive to movement and opening up spaces for 
equality, James Crosswhite argues for an understanding of rhetoric as a “deep rhetoric,” a 
“rhetoric as a form of transcendence, the event by which human beings (but not 
necessarily only human beings) are not simply entities, enclosed within themselves, but 
are movements toward and away from each other, movements towards and away from the 
world…”197 He goes on to write that it’s not so much an individual transcendence that is 
integral to an understanding of deep rhetoric, as it is always a co-transcendence, in which 
there’s a collective movement towards the “good” or what Whitehead would call 
“beauty” via rhetorical argumentation and communication. I’d go further in this statement 
by arguing that literacy, too, allows for a kind of transcendence in and through which one 
can have “a view of the many ways that kairotic realities form themselves… the kairotic 
is the view from within some acknowledged reality but with an awareness of its transient 
and provisional character and of its real possibilities.”198 I’d also make a similar argument 
for illiteracy, as both have their own kinds of rhetorics and their own understandings of 
the many different kairotic moments that swirl and fluctuate around them. For example, 
the literate might be more attuned to the kairotic moments that present themselves in a 
certain academic discourse, while the illiterate might be more attuned to the kairotic 
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moments found in the material world, away from, or underneath, the realm of the written 
word. Either way, the illusion, as Crosswhite writes, is “the view from within a kairotic 
reality but with no experience of or perspective on its being anything else but the way 
things really are.”199 In both cases of the literate and the illiterate, the importance of 
understanding and feeling immanence is so that there can be an opening up – a feeling of 
the ways in which one can, even for a brief moment, be informed by a different way of 
being. I’d argue that one enters into various kairotic moments naturally and organically, 
which in turn influence their being-literate, or their being-illiterate within various kinds 
of symbolisms. It seems that if one is both at the same time, then one can become more-
literate in one instance, and more-illiterate in the next: a realization that may seem banal, 
but that has, as I’ve been arguing, serious implications for how one talks about and 
teaches literacy-as-scripturality.  
 To return back to my earlier statement that literacy should be taught not as a 
currency, but rather as a valuable way in which to interact with and open oneself up to the 
world as a symbolic-aesthetic intensification, I’ve still yet to answer how we should 
actualize such a pedagogy. That is to say, what kind of model would I propose for this 
radically different way of thinking about, and by extension, teaching literacy so that we 
can multiply the number of emancipated-literates who always remember themselves as 
also illiterate, as also poets who can speak to the beauty of the kairotic moments and 
potentialities in every instant, cognizant of the horizontally adjacent indefinite number of 
literacies that influence (and can still be felt within) the dominant literacy. In response to 
this question of a new pedagogy, I admit that I don’t have any definite answers for 
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organization. I’d say, even, that I’ve spent a large amount of this chapter arguing against 
any sort of institution that would try and teach scripturality-as-literacy. Even though I’ve 
argued that there are dangers to having educational methods structured within a specific 
type of institution that convinces or confuses people into believing there’s only ‘one way 
in which to learn’ or that there’s only ‘one type of literacy’ I also realize the importance 
of having structure – even a flexible structure – to act as a foundation for exploration. 
Keeping this in mind, I submit that there needs to be a changing of the way in which we 
think about reading and writing. Specifically, I’d like to see scripturality appropriate the 
current, colloquial definition for literacy (that is, competence with reading and reading in 
a dominant language), and for literacy to be thought of as a lived-practice. This 
fundamental shift in concepts would have major implications for teaching in general.  I 
think, perhaps, it would be useful to encourage classes that study the history of 
symbolism and writing throughout history, problematizing the Western conception of 
literacy, and educating students about the past interaction with the world that laid the 
foundation for a scriptural symbolism to emerge. I would also encourage training – for 
students and teachers alike – that mirrored the training literacy tutors receive when 
working for non-profits that specialize in literacy education. These kinds of non-profit 
trainings focus extensively on socio-economic status, various kinds of symbolisms and 
discourses that go along with those statuses, and generally encourage an ethics and 
pedagogy of caring, in which the tutor is also always trying to learn from the tutee and 
teach scripturality-as-literacy in such a way that it makes sense to the tutee. That is, so 
they are able to connect scriptural life in a way that allows them to be more organized 
and mobile within the scriptural-economy without losing sense of their 
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interconnectedness and empathy. Thinking of including the type of literacy training non-
profits offer, I’m reminded of Ivan Illich when he writes that “efforts to find a new 
balance in the global milieu depend on the denationalization of values.”200 In particular, I 
believe the pedagogy practices in the education institutions now have a lot to learn from 
the type of volunteering pedagogy practices that are encouraged by non-profits.  
 Instead of a literacy pedagogy that presumes the singular truth of its ontology and 
the achievement of individual accolades that necessarily support the belief that not all 
intelligences are equal, I’d advocate for a literacy education that incorporates a sense of 
vulnerability, empathy and connectivity. I call for a pedagogical methodology that allows 
for movement and dynamism and the belief in a multitude of literacies, all of which 
should be mobilized so as to, as Illich writes, “enhance [each person’s] ability to tend and 
care and wait upon the other” knowing that each Other harbors within them a completely 
unique, poetic, literacy that has the potential to move the ever-changing concepts of 
rhetoric and literacy closer to beauty. In this way, the dichotomy of literacy and illiteracy, 
of self and other would be dismantled without losing the lesson it teaches us: that there’s 
a response-ability always there, always informing us. There are many ways in which to 
engage with this responsibility. The only incorrect way is to think that there shouldn’t be 
a change – that there isn’t something one should do for the Other, for the world. The 
dichotomy needs dismantling, and folding literacy and illiteracy into each other, like a 
mobious strip on a horizontal axis, is just one very small way in which to lower the walls 
that have been erected.  
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